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April 1, 2010

01 NSA eavesdropping was illegal, judge says

NSA eavesdropping was illegal, judge says




By Associated Press



Thursday, April 1, 2010


In the strongest legal repudiation yet of the George W. Bush administration’s program of warrantless wiretapping, a federal judge in San Francisco ruled Wednesday that the National Security Agency acted illegally by eavesdropping on the phone conversations of two American lawyers and an Islamic charity.

U.S. District Judge Vaughn R. Walker said that the lawyers and the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation — plaintiffs in a high-profile lawsuit challenging the now-abandoned Terrorist Surveillance Program — are entitled to damages because of the government’s actions.

President Obama‘s Justice Department followed the Bush administration’s strategy of asserting a “state-secrets privilege” to try to stop the case, a tactic that provoked an outcry from the American Civil Liberties Union and other public policy groups. The effort by Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. marked the first time that the Obama administration tried to invoke the privilege.

Bush secretly authorized the surveillance program shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and ended it in 2007. The program allowed National Security Agency officials to bypass the courts and to intercept electronic communications believed to be connected to al-Qaeda.

Generally, government investigators are required to obtain search warrants signed by judges to eavesdrop on domestic phone calls, e-mail traffic and other electronic communications.

Walker’s 45-page ruling marked the second time a federal judge has held that the surveillance program was illegal. In 2006, shortly after the program’s existence was reported by the New York Times, a judge in Detroit found the program to be unconstitutional and ordered that it be stopped. An appeals court vacated that ruling when the plaintiffs could not prove that they were subjected to warrantless wiretapping.

The same year, the branch of al-Haramain in Ashland, Ore., and its lawyers, Wendell Belew and Asim Ghafoor, filed suit against the government.

Belew and Ghafoor alleged that their 2004 phone conversations with Soliman al-Buthi, an official with the Saudi-based foundation, were wiretapped without warrants soon after the Treasury Department declared the Oregon branch to be a supporter of terrorism. They argued that wiretaps installed without a judge’s authorization are illegal.

Anthony Coppolino, the Justice Department lawyer who has represented the government in al-Haramain’s lawsuit since before Obama took office, has never addressed the legality of the Bush administration program.

Rather, Coppolino argued that the case should be tossed out in the name of national security. He said the government risked exposing ongoing intelligence work if the lawsuit were allowed to proceed. The government argued that its state-secrets privilege trumped the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which requires investigators to seek wiretap approval from a special court that operates largely in secrecy.

In his ruling, Walker dismissed that argument, saying the government’s “theory of unfettered executive-branch discretion” created an “obvious potential for abuse.”

And though the government and its attorneys have declined to say whether a secret warrant existed, the judge said it should be assumed that none did.

“We are gratified,” Jon Eisenberg, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs, said of the ruling. “It has been a long time.”

Eisenberg called on the Obama administration to forgo any appeals. Justice Department spokeswoman Tracy Schmaler said the matter is under review.

The Bush administration invoked the secrets privilege numerous times in lawsuits over various post-Sept. 11 programs.

Holder has said Walker was given a classified description of why the case must be dismissed so the court could “conduct its own independent assessment of our claim,” and he has said the administration would respect the outcome of that process.

That was a departure from the Bush administration, which resisted providing specifics about national security concerns to judges handling such cases.

March 30, 2010

01 Tampon-makers can’t mention the V-word. Period.

Filed under: política — fores @ 10:41 am
Tags: ,

Tampon-makers can’t mention the V-word. Period.

An advertising campaign for tampons is rejected by US television networks for daring to include the word vagina



Just don’t say vagina: the acceptable version of the tampon ad.

For years, advertising for tampons and “sanitary products” have been shrouded in nebulous euphemism. So what happens when a US tampon-maker drops the coy messaging and goes straight for the jugular (so to speak)? Its ad gets banned by the major US television networks for mentioning the word vagina.

Even when the company substituted “down there” for vagina, two of the networks still wouldn’t run the ad, so the company was forced to drop the idea altogether. That provoked Amanda Hess, author of The Sexist blog, to observe: “Now, the commercial contains no direct references to female genitalia – you know, the place where the fucking tampon goes.”

An executive for Kimberly-Clark, the owner of Kotex, notes that US TV networks have no such compunction about references to “erectile dysfunction” in prime-time ads for Viagra and Ciallis.

The New York Times reports that the campaign – produced by the advertising agency JWT, part of WPP – for tampon brand Kotex was “a bit too frank” for US television:

Merrie Harris, global business director at JWT, said that after being informed that it could not use the word vagina in advertising by three broadcast networks, it shot the ad cited above with the actress instead saying “down there”, which was rejected by two of the three networks. (Both Ms Harris and representatives from the brand declined to specify the networks.)

“It’s very funny because the whole spot is about censorship,” Ms Harris said. “The whole category has been very euphemistic, or paternalistic even, and we’re saying, enough with the euphemisms, and get over it. Tampon is not a dirty word, and neither is vagina.”

The amended ad shown above, “How do I feel about my period?”, has a series of images parodying the stock images used in sanitary product advertising, and concludes: “The ads on TV are really helpful because they use that blue liquid, and I’m like, oh, that’s what’s supposed to happen.” The ad debuted on US television this week.

Things are different in anything-goes Britain, where the makers of the Mooncup product have a website entitled loveyourvagina.com.

March 26, 2010

01 A Mind of His Own

Filed under: recomendaciones — fores @ 8:17 pm

A Mind of His Own

By EMILY BAZELON
Published: March 25, 2010

Many scientists are cautious to a fault when it comes to telling us what they’re unsure of, playing down any novel finding that hasn’t been verified by another scientist. Not so Louann Brizendine. She is a neuro­psychiatrist (the prefix makes any title sound smarter) who has put her professional training behind a breezy, incautious account of how the brain, urged on by hormones, makes men and women act completely differently. You’d never know from reading Brizendine that beneath the sea she blithely sails are depths that researchers have only just begun to chart.



Adam Nadel for The New York Times

Louann Brizendine

THE MALE BRAIN

By Louann Brizendine

271 pp. Broadway Books. $24.99

Related

How Women Think (September 10, 2006)

Brizendine nods to the fact that the brains of men and women are mostly alike. But her emphasis is entirely on the “profound differences” between them. This is clearly the best-seller strategy, neatly bisected into two books. “The Female Brain,” published in 2006, drove reviewers in publications like Nature mad but lit up the talk show circuit and the Amazon rankings. “The Male Brain” is positioned for a similar second round. Would Brizendine have gotten this kind of pop for a single book called “The Male and Female Brain: Mostly One and the Same”? Not a chance.

Each chapter of “The Male Brain” covers patients at various stages of the life cycle. At every step — the Dennis the Menace child, the oversexed teenager, the middle-aged man who falls for a younger woman — Brizendine gives a theory for how her patient’s behavior is caused by his male brain patterns, egged on by hormones like testosterone (nicknamed “Zeus”) and vasopressin (“the White Knight”). The publicity materials claim that Brizendine “overturns the stereotypes about men and boys.” In fact, Brizendine chooses patients who typify a familiar stereotype and then explains their actions as the inevitable-seeming work of Zeus and his henchmen.

Take David, who at age 3 turns a blow dryer on his friend’s stream of pee as it hits the toilet. Brizendine traces the causes of this mischief-making back to the first day of his life: “David was only 24 hours old, and without encouragement or instruction from anyone, he stared at the rotating triangles and squares on the mobile and seemed to find them fascinating.” The image comes from one much-discussed lab experiment. Other scientists have tried and failed to replicate the finding that day-old boy babies look at objects while newborn girls look at faces. But neither Brizendine’s text nor her cursory endnotes give any hint of this uncertainty. The idea, however sketchy, seems to be that boys are hard-wired to break the rules because from birth they are less interested in human emotions than in objects, and so don’t respond to parental disapproval the way girls do.

In her introduction, Brizendine promises to answer questions about how much “gendered behavior is innate and how much is learned.” But she throws nurture overboard in favor of nature every chance she gets. “The Male Brain” is filled with sentences like “Boys are programmed to move” and, about the older man drawn to the younger woman, “He was being biologically bewitched to bond with her.” With all those powerful hormones, does personal psychology or experience stand a chance?

Yet Brizendine’s description of how men and boys act isn’t in itself off base. While there is a far wider spectrum of behavior than she ever acknowledges — apparently her patients include no timid boys or unassuming men — many boys do act more turbocharged than many girls. If you try to wish away gender differences by giving your son a doll to play with, you may find, as Brizendine did, that he’s using it as a sword. The toy preferences of preschoolers are one of the greatest sex differences that psychologists have found, and Brizendine is on far safer ground when she turns to them. The problem is that she never tells you so. There’s no way to know from her heedless tour which sex differences are well established and which are not, which research is in its infancy and which solid and mature.

Brizendine has been here before. Her first book got particular attention for the claim that women speak faster than men (250 versus 125 words per minute) and use more words throughout the day, an average of 20,000 compared with 7,000. This was a conversation starter that lined up perfectly with stereotype — Chatty Cathy, quantified! Except that it turned out there were no studies backing up the words-per-minute claim, which Brizendine later removed from the paperback edition. Her claim that women use more words than men fell apart, too, when a paper published in Science found that the average man and woman use the same number of words (about 16,000 during the course of a day). But Brizendine has stuck with that claim, which she says was based on her own “observation,” and on a paper that referred to the vocabularies of 20-month-old girls, whose author disavows the leap Brizendine makes.

Emily Bazelon is a senior editor at Slate and the Truman Capote law and media fellow at Yale Law School.

March 22, 2010

01 The Money Fighting Health Care Reform

Filed under: política — fores @ 6:30 pm
Tags: , ,

Volume 57, Number 6 · April 8, 2010

The Money Fighting Health Care Reform

By Michael Tomasky

It’s chastening to think back to the predictions being made last summer about health care reform, and the assumptions that were widely shared in Washington at the time (certainly by me). Reform would face challenges, and it would never go as far or be as comprehensive as liberals wanted it to be. But some new law would pass by Thanksgiving or sooner. The stars that had defied alignment since the early attempts to pass national health legislation under Teddy Roosevelt were now fully in place.

Something may yet pass. But the price of reform has escalated considerably since last June. Barack Obama has lost about fifteen points in approval ratings, hovering at or just below 50 percent. In all polls, independent voters are more disapproving of Obama and of the Democrats’ health legislation than not. Citizens quite reasonably asked themselves why Obama and the Democrats have been spending so much time on health care while unemployment soared to 10 percent. Republicans have acquired momentum from the public opposition and now stand to make significant gains in the mid-term elections. The Democrats lost their supposedly “bullet-proof” Senate supermajority and, according to polls, came to look to many average voters as if they couldn’t govern. And even if health reform does pass, its putative benefits—insuring 30 million more people, lowering premiums, controlling costs—won’t go into effect until 2014. And the risk is still substantial that the effort will end in defeat.

What happened? It’s still too early to be sure, but broadly speaking, we can divide the chaotic details of the past several months into two categories: the political and the institutional. Obama and his administration certainly made their share of political errors, many stemming from the President’s having learned the wrong lessons from history, specifically the 1994 defeat of the Clinton effort. Whereas Bill and Hillary Clinton presented a plan to Congress that gave the key legislators comparatively little opportunity to collaborate on health policy or to take credit for it, Obama did the opposite to a fault. He gave the House and Senate too much time and leeway to develop their own plans. The administration finally announced its own reform principles on February 22, long after both houses of Congress had passed different versions of a bill.

There were arguably even bigger miscalculations than that. In my view, attempting comprehensive health care reform during Obama’s first year with a very bad (and weakening) economy was asking a lot of the American people. The 2008 election was a rejection of conservatism, but it was not an embrace of liberalism. Any chance of a new liberal era, I wrote here in 2008, “would depend on what President Obama and the congressional Democrats did with their power.”[1] I believed they should first prove themselves competent economic stewards; having gained a solid majority of the public’s trust on that most basic issue (and set themselves in sympathetic contrast to the GOP on it), the Democrats might have then convinced voters to follow them down the path of health care reform and new environmental rules, among other urgent matters.[2]

In some ways the larger impediments to reform have been institutional. Congress has not passed a piece of major progressive social legislation for many years. One could call the creation of Medicare Part D in 2003 a “landmark” in that it established a new entitlement—prescription drugs—thus expanding Medicare considerably. But it also greatly increased the importance of the private sector in Medicare, with consequences that are still playing out. For example, privately offered fee-for-service plans, so-called Medicare Advantage plans, have expanded rapidly since 2003. And Republicans constructed the bill in such a way that the new coverage wasn’t paid for.

There are a few other serious accomplishments from the 1990s and 1980s—the expansion of the earned income tax credit of 1993, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Simpson-Mazzoli immigration act of 1986, and perhaps others. But for the really major changes, which were made over a fairly short period, we have to go back farther: the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts (1970 and 1972, respectively); Medicare and Medicaid (1965); the Voting Rights Act (the same year); the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

One important question raised by watching this process has been: Is Congress capable of passing major, progressive domestic legislation anymore? Even if the answer in this case turns out to be yes by a few votes, by means of the reconciliation process, the question deserves our attention. Liberals are sitting on several important pieces of legislation they’d like to see passed, on the environment, labor, energy, and climate, to name only a few. Can Congress confront these issues?

It’s true that Congress is simply more conservative in general than it once was—it has fewer members inclined to back broad domestic legislation. In addition, however, two crushing institutional obstacles have arisen since the 1960s and the 1970s. One concerns procedural rules, especially the Senate’s cloture rule requiring sixty votes to end debate and bring any matter to the floor for a final vote, avoiding a dreaded filibuster. Demands for cloture votes were rare until the mid-1970s. They increased rapidly over the decades and then doubled after the GOP lost the Senate in 2006. This matter has begun to receive attention in the press (and will be the subject of a future piece here).

The other obstacle has to do with the power of money in politics: through lobbying, advertising, and campaign contributions. This subject is less often discussed. It’s an old story now,[3] and people just more or less accept it as the state of things. Political reporters focus on the day-to-day political process. So the money story is usually left to the dwindling investigative staffs of news organizations—and, in our age, to a small number of Web sites that track donations and influence. These sites do an excellent job, but they aren’t well known to the larger public, and lobbies or large donors make the news only when something deeply suspicious occurs—when the press can identify a quid pro quo. And yet, influence only rarely works that way. Politicians and lobbyists both know better than to speak to each other about votes in exchange for financial support. Direct causation between Contribution A and Vote B can almost never be established.

There have, though, been some instances where the influence of powerful corporate lobbies has been clear. They won obvious victories in defeating amendments on the floor or in committee on issues such as drug reimportation from abroad, bringing generic drugs to market more quickly, and closing the so-called Medicare prescription drug “donut hole” (by which Medicare covers prescription costs up to $2,700 and over $6,154 but not in between). As I will discuss later, much of this action reflected a deal the administration made with the powerful pharmaceutical lobby, “Big Pharma,” whose chief concerns include these matters and the issue of allowing Medicare to negotiate drug prices, which the lobby opposes. Since February 22, the administration has backed away from this deal, thus completely closing the donut hole.

Beyond these and a few other cases, the direct effects of the large interests and their money can be difficult to discern. But the dollar figures are staggering. The lobbyists have been at this for a long time, so we must assume that they know what they’re doing, and that they are spending all that money for a reason.

In all, federal lobbyists and their clients spent more than $3.47 billion last year. That is an all-time high, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, whose executive director notes dryly that lobbying is one business that appears to be “recession proof.”[4] The center tracks spending by thirteen broad categories of economic activity. The biggest-spending sector was something it calls “miscellaneous business,” including retail and manufacturing, which spent $558 million last year. The health sector finished a close second at $544 million, an increase of about 12 percent over its 2008 total. When looking beyond those sectors to individual industries, the center found that the “pharmaceutical and health products” industry was the largest-spending industry last year, putting $267 million into its lobbying efforts, which stands as the largest amount ever spent by a single industry in one year. Those efforts include payments to individual lobbyists who talk to legislators, send them information, and get in touch with others who may influence them. The center notes that last year’s fourth quarter, from September to December 2009, was the first quarter in history in which all spending for lobbying topped $900 million; it reached $955 million, a 16 percent increase over the fourth quarter of 2008.

Common Cause issued a report last June that got much attention by announcing that health interests were spending $1.4 million a day lobbying Congress.[5] But that number surely grew over the course of last year. That fourth quarter, after all, was when both the House and Senate finally passed their bills. The Senate was in session for fifty-five days and the House for forty-one, averaging out to forty- eight working congressional days. The $955 million cited by the Center for Responsive Politics for the fourth quarter of 2009 was for lobbying in all categories, not just health care. It amounts to almost exactly $20 million a day. Clearly a considerable chunk of that was spent lobbying the two houses on the most important legislation before them at the time.

The National Journal, through its Web site Under the Influence, collects similar data. It has tracked the money laid out by the twenty-five highest-spending organizations lobbying about health care, among them major insurance firms, business lobbies, and various medical trade associations. These numbers are therefore smaller but still enormous, amounting to a combined total of over $288 million in 2009. The biggest spender was the US Chamber of Commerce, a leading opponent of reform, which spent $123 million in 2009. Undoubtedly not all of that was on health care, but the Chamber did spend more than half that amount, or a staggering $71 million, in the fourth quarter of 2009 alone. On March 10, the Associated Press reported that the Chamber was coordinating a multimillion-dollar ad campaign by insurance companies to stop health care reform. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the most powerful pharmaceutical lobbying organization, spent $26 million. The AARP spent $21 million; the American Medical Assocation, $20 million. Some conspicuous participants in the debate spent lower figures—America’s Health Insurance Plans, or AHIP, the best-known insurers’ lobby, spent $8.85 million last year. (Some individual insurance companies have their own lobbies.) The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association spent the same amount.

These National Journal figures remind us that not all lobbying is corporate and opposed to reform that will expand coverage. The AARP, for example, has been consistently in favor of such reform, even the proposed cuts to Medicare that the administration wants in order to finance its health program. The group’s support for reform caused tens of thousands of AARP members to quit, CBS reported last summer.[6]

Some of the smaller spenders in favor of reform have relatively narrow concerns. For example, in 2009, the American Cancer Society’s Cancer Action Network spent more than $4 million to advance preventive measures against cancer, such as more money for early screening and antismoking programs. Labor unions, of course, supported reform, but their amounts spent on lobbying were piddling compared to those of the corporations. The AFL-CIO spent just $2.26 million, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, $2.87 million. Generally speaking, all but a tiny portion of lobbying money was spent either opposing the reform legislation outright or bending it to reflect corporate goals.

In addition, it’s worth remembering that, apart from lobbying legislators, these organizations spend vast sums for television and radio advertising. Last month, The National Journal ‘s Peter H. Stone reported that AHIP solicited between $10 million and $20 million from six large insurers—Cigna, Aetna, Humana, Wellpoint, Kaiser Foundation Health Plans, and UnitedHealth Group—that was funneled to the Chamber of Commerce to underwrite television ads opposing reform by two business coalitions set up by the Chamber.[7] (AHIP was critical of both houses’ bills, it said, because, among other reasons, costs would skyrocket, even though insurers stand to gain millions of new clients.) PhRMA, as part of its deal with the White House, agreed to spend $100 million on television ads in support of reform—$100 million that, as everyone involved surely knew, could as readily have been spent on anti-reform ads if the outcome of the negotiations over the legislation had been less to PhRMA’s liking.

At one point last year, more than 3,300 people were registered as lobbyists on health care. That’s six for every member of Congress, House and Senate combined. Even the defense industry, according to Bloomberg News, had only two for every member.[8] “We hear from lobbyists all the time,” said Representative Frank Pallone, a New Jersey Democrat who heads the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Health Subcommittee. Just what they say is seldom made public, but some accounts suggest that lobbyists have mastered the art of explaining to lawmakers why their position serves the common good, and the best ones are invariably well versed in the arcana of their particular policy concerns; lawmakers sometimes turn to them for guidance on the possible impact of a certain provision in a bill; and lobbyists may suggest measures they want incorporated in a bill or eliminated from it. We gather that, with few exceptions, they make many of the same arguments against the reform legislation that we hear from members of the Republican caucus.

About one in ten of those 3,300 lobbyists was a former government staffer or member of Congress, according to The Washington Post.[9] Nearly half of the 350 or so former governmental employees turned lobbyists once worked on Capitol Hill for key legislators or committees—something that surely didn’t hurt their chances of getting access to Congress. The Post reported, for example:

A June 10 meeting between aides to [Max] Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and health-care lobbyists included two former Baucus chiefs of staff: David Castagnetti, whose clients include PhRMA and America’s Health Insurance Plans, and Jeffrey A. Forbes, who represents PhRMA, Amgen, Genentech, Merck, and others. Castagnetti did not return a telephone call; Forbes declined to comment.

Also inside the closed committee hearing room that day was Richard Tarplin, a veteran of both the Department of Health and Human Services and the Senate, where he worked for Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), one of the leaders in fashioning reform legislation this year. Tarplin now represents the American Medical Association as head of his own lobbying firm, Tarplin Strategies.

“For people like me who are on the outside and used to be on the inside, this is great, because there is a level of trust in these relationships, and I know the policy rationale that is required,” Tarplin said in explaining the benefits of having government experience.

PhRMA, at one point, employed forty-eight lobbying firms, in addition to its in-house operation, and had a total of 165 people lobbying for its positions—137 of whom had previous government experience, mostly in Congress, according to Paul Blumenthal of the watchdog group the Sunlight Foundation, which has done excellent work on these connections.[10]

We don’t know just what goes on at these meetings and probably will never know. Baucus posted his public schedule last year, so it was possible to see, as Blumenthal calculated, that he had held twenty meetings with health industry representatives, mostly drug makers and insurers, as well as twelve with representatives of public interest associations.

Baucus’s record raises the question of the other major category of corporate expenditure, campaign contributions, which are distinct from the rest of the money spent on lobbying. According to the invaluable opensecrets .org, Baucus has raised about $2 million from the health sector during the last five years, including during his 2008 reelection campaign (which is when contributions from key industries to senators tend to spike). In his low-cost state of Montana—population 968,000—he won reelection that year with 73 percent of the vote. (The illustration on page 12 gives a sampling of health sector contributions to Baucus between 2007 and 2009.)

Other members of Baucus’s “Gang of Six”—the three Democrats and three Republicans who negotiated the Senate Finance Committee bill last year—have received substantial campaign contributions from the health sector during the same five-year period: Republican Chuck Grassley took in $813,000, Democrat Kent Conrad $689,000, with each of the others closer to $400,000. Only Grassley faces reelection this year, and his seat is considered safe.

In all, organizations and individuals in the health industry have given $27.6 million in campaign contributions during 2009–2010, with 54 percent of that going to Democrats. About $9.6 million of that total has come from pharmaceutical interests, and $7.5 million from hospitals and nursing homes. Taken together, their contributions amount to roughly between $100,000 and $300,000 for most incumbent senators and for representatives, who all face reelection fights this year.

In 2008 Obama himself received $19.5 million from health-related donors, compared to John McCain’s $7.4 million. This should be compared with the $750 million he raised overall, and with the larger contributions he received from lawyers and from members of the communications and finance industries, among others.

What are the various members of the health industry getting in return for all these dollars? Some caution is in order here. On the big question, the private insurers won: if a health care bill is passed, it would contain no public option, no federal alternative that might compete with them. But many factors influence a member of Congress’s vote or position. Democratic Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska, for example, has received hefty contributions from the health sector during the past five years, $759,000. But he’s also a fairly conservative senator from a very conservative state that happens also to be home to large insurance interests, including Mutual of Omaha. Is he doing their bidding, or is he protecting legitimate constituent interests, or is he merely following his own cautious political instincts? Or may he see all three coinciding in the public interest?

The clearest case of a powerful lobby winning its arguments behind closed doors on health issues, documented by the Sunlight Foundation’s Blumenthal, involved PhRMA’s deal with the White House.[11] PhRMA’s chief interests are three. First, the group opposes allowing Medicare to negotiate drug prices for seniors, which experts say would result in lower prices (and profits). The absence of such a provision in the 2003 Medicare bill caused many Democrats to oppose it. Second, it opposes drug “reimportation,” i.e., bringing in prescription drugs from other countries where prices are cheaper (opponents of reimportation cite concerns about safety and standards). Finally, PhRMA is concerned that Congress might hit it with the full cost, estimated at around $135 billion, of closing the so-called Medicare “donut hole.”

Obama campaigned in favor of closing the donut hole and allowing drug reimportation and Medicare drug price negotiation. Blumenthal documents how, step by step, PhRMA won on every point in negotiations both with White House officials and with Max Baucus. Several meetings during the spring and summer involved PhRMA CEO Billy Tauzin, a former member of Congress from Louisiana, Baucus or his staffers, and White House officials including Deputy Chief of Staff Jim Messina, who once worked for Baucus. Obama had dropped his campaign positions. The agreement was that nothing in the legislation would cost PhRMA more than $80 billion total (of which a reported $50 billion would go toward the donut hole problem).

As Baucus’s committee was preparing the final version of the health care bill last fall, Democrat Bill Nelson of Florida introduced a measure that would have closed the donut hole completely. The amendment failed 10–13, with Baucus and all Republicans opposing it, joined by Bob Menendez of New Jersey and Tom Carper of Delaware. Baucus and Carper both said at the time that they were standing by the White House’s deal with PhRMA. The White House was pressuring senators to keep to the deal. The three Democrats who voted with the Republicans also happened to be the top three Democratic recipients of PhRMA’s donations since 2003.

Then, as the full Senate debated amendments to the bill last December, North Dakota’s Byron Dorgan put forward a measure to allow drug reimportation. It received fifty-one votes, but it failed, because it was brought up under cloture rules requiring sixty votes. Dorgan’s amendment had been scheduled for a vote the previous week, but that vote was postponed. Then, several senators who had been on record as supporting reimportation switched their votes to “nay,” under pressure from Senate leaders and the White House, according to a report at the time in the Huffington Post, whose Ryan Grim followed the PhRMA deal closely. According to his report, when the roll was called and Connecticut’s Chris Dodd said “nay,” Vermont’s Bernie Sanders stage-whispered loudly enough to be heard in the press gallery: “Dodd?!”

Earlier last year, in the House, Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Henry Waxman had fought for a provision that would make so-called “biologic” drugs, which derive from living cells and are typically expensive, available in generic form in as little as five years, something PhRMA also opposed. Democrat Anna Eshoo of California, pairing with the committee’s ranking Republican, Joe Barton of Texas, introduced a substitute measure slowing that process to twelve years (Eshoo denied at the time that her amendment did that, but Waxman said it did). It passed 47–11 in committee. Eshoo has received $112,000 in pharmaceutical donations so far in 2009–2010, making it the industry that is most generous to her.

With the plan it released on February 22, the Obama administration took some steps to challenge these lobbies. The insurance industry dislikes the administration’s proposal for a federal rate-review board, a seven-member body led by the secretary of health and human services that would review rate increases. (The administration suggested the review board in response to a plan by California’s largest private insurer, Anthem, to hike the rate paid by some of its customers by 39 percent.) In addition, the administration has now proposed closing the donut hole completely. This can’t sit well with PhRMA, although it should be noted that, of the association’s big three issues, closing the donut hole would cost less than drug reimportation or a requirement to negotiate Medicare prices. Assuming the House and Senate finally decide to pass a health reform bill, it will be interesting to see whether these provisions make the cut.

In fairness, the bill’s many positive features should be recognized. It ends discrimination based on preexisting conditions and development of catastrophic illnesses. It eliminates price discrimination based on health status and offers subsidies for up to 30 million currently uninsured people. It establishes a host of other precedents concerning cost control and new services that would, taken together, still be a major, even astonishing, step forward. As big a victory as that would be, it will remain the case that it could have been a considerably better bill, in both providing medical care and controlling costs.

Whether it passes or not, the institutional pressures of big money have effectively and quietly deformed central parts of the bill and continue to loom over any attempt by Congress to write and pass major domestic legislation. Stronger financial regulation is now being resisted daily by Wall Street lobbies. It’s not a coincidence that there have been fewer and fewer pieces of large-scale economic and social legislation since big money has increasingly dominated politics from the 1980s on. The question that remains open is whether there is any effective way of revealing what is being bought and sold in Congress.

—March 11, 2010

Notes

[1]See “How Historic a Victory?,” The New York Review, December 18, 2008.

[2]The arguments for tackling health care immediately were twofold. Substantively, spiraling health care costs are a first-order issue. Politically, strike while the iron is hot—while Obama had the political capital and the Democrats had sixty votes in the Senate.

[3]One of the first journalistic investigations into all this was by Elizabeth Drew, in her Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption (Macmillan, 1983).

[4]See “Federal Lobbying Climbs in 2009 as Lawmakers Execute Aggressive Congressional Agenda,” www.opensecrets.org, February 12, 2010.

[5]See “Legislating Under the Influence,” www.commoncause.org/healthcare2009.

[6]See “Thousands Quit AARP Over Health Reform,” www.cbsnews.com, August 17, 2009. The AARP says that it gains “hundreds of thousands” of members every month.

[7]See Peter H. Stone, “Health Insurers Funded Chamber Attack Ads,” undertheinfluence.nationaljournal.com, January 12, 2010.

[8]See Jonathan D. Salant and Lizzie O’Leary, “Six Lobbyists Per Lawmaker Work on Health Overhaul,” www.bloomberg.com, August 14, 2009.

[9]See Dan Eggen and Kimberly Kindy, “Familiar Players in Health Bill Lobbying,” The Washington Post, July 6, 2009.

[10]See Paul Blumenthal, “Researching and Writing the White House–PhRMA Deal,” blog.sunlightfoundation.com, February 16, 2010.

[11]See Paul Blumenthal, “The Legacy of Billy Tauzin: The White House–PhRMA Deal,” blog.sunlightfoundation.com, February 12, 2010.

March 11, 2010

01 Making Google’s Services More Relevant for Non-Elite Chinese Users

My Suggestions for Making Google’s Services More Relevant for Non-Elite Chinese Users (involves some ethnography!)

Google announced on its company blog that Chinese hackers had attacked its users and as a result Google.CN may leave China due to the security breaches.

While unfortunate that Google.CN may be shutting down, my ethnographic work in China revealed five things that aren’t being told in the current story:

  1. Many Chinese internet users don’t find Google to be very useful. Therefore, a Google withdrawal would not have any immediate impact on the daily Chinese internet user because most people search with Baidu, the reigning search engine in China.
  2. Many Chinese internet users prefer Baidu over Google because using Baidu makes them feel more “Chinese.” Baidu does an excellent job at tapping into nationalistic fervor to promote itself as being the most superior search engine for Chinese users.
  3. Chinese internet users don’t know how to get to the Google site. While they may “know” of Google, it’s a whole other matter when it comes to typing or saying Google’s name.
  4. Google is primarily used by highly educated netizens. And even these users prefer Google.COM over Google.CN.
  5. Google is not successful at reaching the mobile internet market.

I arrived at these insights after I spent over 300 hours conducting participant observation and informal interviews this past summer with government policy-makers, academics, youth, migrants, and low-income users. I was funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) (more info) to be a research scholar at the China Internet Network Information Center 中 国互联网络信息中心 (CNNIC), located in Beijing, China. The center is overseen by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). CNNIC manages the hardware aspect of China’s internet and produces quantitatively oriented research on internet usage in China. Their data provides policy direction for party ministries, information for private companies, and statistics for the government. While my main focus was not on Google (more info on research), the topic frequently came up and I started realizing that the non-use of Google provided a lot of cultural insights into the practices of Chinese internet users.

The blame for Google’s lack of success in China cannot solely be placed on this most recent episode with Chinese hackers. Other complications have started long before this occurrence, such as the myriad of ways in which policies work to favor Chinese companies over international ones, the difficulty in competing against government paid search results on Baidu, and the impossibility of providing consistent service when the government shuts down access to the entire Google site for few days. All of these reasons lie beyond Google’s control.

There are, however, other explanations that do lie within Google’s control in which they have failed to execute. The 3 main factors are: achieving brand recognition, creating a successful marketing campaign, and understanding usage contexts of non-elite internet users. Google should hold themselves accountable for these factors.

Google has failed at brand recognition. They have not been successful at making their services relevant for the average Chinese internet user nor have they made it easy for people to recognize, say, or even type in their name on a keyboard.

  • People didn’t even know how to correctly pronounce and agree on the pronunciation of the name “Google.” When I was with a group of 5 youth, I asked them if they used Google, instead of getting an answer we launched into a 10 minute conversation trying to figure out the correct name. While it was clear that we were all referring to Google, the IT company, it was not clear which characters to use for its name. Google does not have an immediately recognizable name like Apple (Pingguo) or Yahoo (Yahe) or Baidu.  I, like many other Chinese people still refer to Google by its colloquial name, GouGou – doggy (狗狗).  While Google did consider GouGou as a name, in 2006 it announced that its new name would be Gu-Ge” (谷歌). But the name didn’t stick and so many people still continued to refer to Google as GouGou. Gu-Ge is supposed to mean “harvest songs”— romantic referral to a  “fruitful and productive search experience, in a poetic Chinese way”.  I guess that Google excecs thought, “Hey if Chinese peasants sings happy harvest songs for their productive crops, then Chinese netizens will use Gu-Ge for happy productive online searches!” Hmmmm…Back in 2006 I argued that the new name was quiet “a semantic stretch.” Even worse, it conjured up images of “slow and remote agricultural scenes,” said  Jin Ge, a researcher on Chinese online gamers. The new name was so unpopular that Google fans started an online petition in 2006 for Google to abandon Gu-Ge. Google didn’t listen. The lesson? When your market cannot pronounce, remember or correctly identify your name, you’ve got a major problem—especially when your names invokes images of sterile hinterlands or groins, grasshoppers, and shaving breasts.

The confusion over Google’s Chinese name also has other consequences: people were unsure of how to type in the name “Google” on the computer keyboard. When I asked people to take me to the Google site, I received a lot of similar responses of uncertainty.

  • Some youth would attempt to type GouGou (the colloquial name for Google) and they would reach GouGou.cn or GouGou.com thinking that they were at the Google site because it looked similar to Google’s bare aesthetics even though the corporate symbol is a dog. Since many people, even me, still refer to Google as GouGou,  it’s not a surprise that people thought that they were at Google’s site even though they were at GouGou.com.  Others would type “Gogel,” which lead to nowhere.
  • Those who typed Google with just one “O” (Gogle) would get to the Google site only IF they typed in .COM. domain.  If they just pressed the enter key after typing in “Gogle” it would take them to Gogle.CN, which is a phishing site. This is even more confusing because Gogle.CN is designed to look like Google’s bare aesthetics. If you click on “Login 登录” in the top right corner where the Gmail login is usually located on the real Google site, you’re taken to a page that says Gogle.CN Login but its page is titled Google!  As you can see in the picture below and where I’ve circled in pink, it’s really misleading! I’ve noticed that most computers default to the .CN site in internet cafes, so this could hypothetically happen quite often if Chinese users try to go to Google and they type in the name  with one less “O.”
  • IF youth did get to Google’s site successfully by either typing in the name correctly or going to Google.com, Gogle.COM, or Guge.COM/CN, it would usually be on their 5th or 7th or even 8th try – that is if they hadn’t given up yet and by then it was just clear that they were doing it because I had asked them to show me how to get to the Google site. It was quite obvious that going to the Google site was never part of their internet routine.

It’s not the case that people are unfamiliar with Google.  People know of Google, but they don’t want to use it because it’s associated with being “Un-Chinese.” Part of Baidu’s success lies in its successful marketing campaign against Google, using nationalism as one of their publicity strategies. It’s been working well. The campaign is so effective that netizens associate the use of Google with being unpatriotic. In this infamous Baidu commercial from 2006 (below), Baidu wins an intelligence contest over the its unnamed foreign competiter who is represented by the white male actor. Baidu succeeds in “knowing more” in the back and forth banter over the meaning of the scroll. Even the white man’s Chinese female lover decides to leave him for the Chinese scholar who “knows more.”

I don’t think Baidu is playing unfairly because American companies often tap into US nationalism with “Buy Made in the USA” campaigns. Google just needs to be more creative in using more strategic marketing to overcome its negative cultural stigma in China—a stigma that is actively nurtured by its competitor.

Another way that Baidu has had an advantage over Google is that Chinese and Hong Kong TV programming will show screen-shots of Baidu when they refer to the internet. Most recently I watched a a show on the Phoenix Channel (Hong Kong based) on January 22nd that showed several screen-shots of how Baidu helped a kidnapped child reunite with his biological parents after 12 years of separation. There are so many stories that talk about how the internet, as symbolized by Baidu, has helped citizens in everyday life. I have yet to see a negative TV segment on the internet that is associated with Baidu, rather these negative associations are blamed on specific applications, such World of Warcraft or specific places, such as internet cafes. Baidu itself is always in the clear, whereas Google is not. The only screen time Google gets on Chinese TV programming is when it is featured as another Western company disobeying Chinese laws. Google should be aware of how Baidu’s onscreen TV time contributes to its popularity and reinforces the notion that Baidu is good for the Chinese, Google is not.

But here’s the thing, solving the marketing and brand recognition problem is relatively simple when the bigger problem is that Google’s services are not useful!

  • Youth didn’t see how any of the services offered by Google were easier to use than the ones that they were already using. This is because Google operates in an e-mail paradigm while other services operate in a messenger paradigm. One time when I was checking my Gmail account at an internet cafe, a youth asked me, ” how do you leave pictures and messages for others?” I would say, “just send them an email.” But here’s the thing – youth don’t have to send emails when they are using MSN Messenger. There’s a major disconnect in communication culture. Messenger-like services don’t operate on an email paradigm. QQ and MSN users can go to a friend’s MSN Live profile or QQ box to leave a message or post a photo. You can check on each friend’s page to see their last update.  It’s like a mini-facebook for every MSN user but just for your own contacts. If a friend wasn’t online, youth didn’t send them an email. Rather, they would click on the user’s name and write a direct message that would be sent immediately but read later when the recipient logged in at a later point in time.
  • One teenager asked me how I shared music with Gmail. I tried to explain that I used Dropbox and I put the file my public folder and then give the url to my friend. By the time I was done with my explanation, she looked totally confused. I asked her how her and her friends shared music. She said, oh I just put it in my QQ box and my friends can go in and download it. My way didn’t make sense for them and my method didn’t even involve Google.  QQ and MSN make it easy for youth to exchange files without emails and without having to own your own computer. We need to understand what it means to live in an instant messaging paradigm as opposed to an e-mail paradigm.
  • By the way, this is also what I’ve observed outside of the US in Mexico, where my most recent fieldwork continues to show that the primary online communication method are messenger services, not email.
  • Mobiles are becoming more popular and other companies are doing a better job of delivering mobile content and services. For example, several high school students showed me how they could access MSN Messenger and QQ chat on their cellphone for mobile internet. I asked them why they chose to use these apps. Some youth told me that they were already on the phone when they bought it (some were used), and others told me that it was really easy to download when you go the MSN or QQ site at an internet cafe. One of the most important reasons is that most people already have a MSN or QQ account. So when they begin to use mobile internet, the transition to using mobile MSN or QQ Messenger is an obvious one.
  • For many of these low-income youth, mobile internet was used more frequently than internet cafes. They didn’t have a computer at home but what they did have was a cellphone that always had a signal. Another example is that cellphone companies have partnerships with Baidu or QQ Tencent to deliver mobile content. People would often show me a SMS of the latest news updates from Baidu. They told me that when they bought the cellphone, the vendor would help them sign up for the services. Google needs to think about how to cross into mobile services because other companies have deep relationships with mobile carriers to ensure that a new mobile user receives content from their company.

So who is using Google in China? Google is primarily used by elite Chinese users while Baidu is mainly used by non-elites. What’s the difference between elite and non-elite users? Elite users are those who are highly educated and can speak or at least read English. Interestingly, the biggest fans of Google were Chinese academics age 18 years and older. They used Google Scholar, Google Translation and Gmail for the same purposes as Western users. They relied on Google for their research and said that there was no site that even matched Google’s services. The way that Chinese professors, researchers, and academics work is more akin to the way that Westerners manage their relationships and projects. Therefore, the adoption of Google among highly educated Chinese is not surprising. Highly educated Chinese users organize and prioritize information in ways that are much more similar to Western users than non-elite Chinese users.

Sometimes you will hear me say, “I cannot imagine life without Google!” And it’s true – I can’t imagine living without my Gcal, Reader, Apps, Voice, Docs, and etc.  Chinese academics who read English would often say the same thing when we talked about Google, frequently professing their love for Google. For these intellectuals, they didn’t feel less “Chinese” for using Google. My impression was that they felt more informed, could access media beyond China, and were more aware of global discourses (this includes celebrity gossip).

While Google may have a loyal following among Chinese academics, they only make up a small percentage of the population. If Google wants to become a more popular search engine in China, it has to do a better job at reaching non-elite users. Google isn’t going to get anywhere as the search engine for the intellectuals of China. 

Google has built an empire of services that work for Western contexts and values. So it’s no surprise that their most loyal fans outside of the US are elite users who share similar class and occupational backgrounds with Western users. To reach new users with an entirely different set of cultural practices, Google has to rethink and reinvent itself for the Chinese market.  Sometimes, one size does not fit all.

It’s one thing if Google’s difficulties could just simply be attributed to government interference, and bad marketing and publicity. But that’s not the case. Their services just simply are not useful for most Chinese users. I suggest that Google dedicate itself to understanding the Chinese market in a socio-anthropological way. They should be hiring teams of Chinese and non-Chinese  ethnographers, sociologists, and anthropologists to work intimately in all phases with human-computer interaction designers, programmers, and R&D managers. Google should invest in long-term fieldwork for teams to immerse themselves in a diversity of environments. While usability tests and focus groups are useful for specific phases of app development, they aren’t as useful for understanding cultural frameworks and practices because by the time an app is being tested, it already has accumulated so many cultural assumptions along the way in the design process that users are asked to test something that functions in the programmer’s world, not the user’s world.

I hope Google doesn’t leave China because both sides would lose. I would like to see the Chinese government ease off of Google. And I would like to see Google.CN re-orientate itself to create such overwhelmingly great and relevant services that Chinese netizens will WANT to use their apps.

Competition and collaboration are essential factors for an innovative market.

The last thing that China wants to communicate to the world is that it does not offer a fair playground for companies to compete against each other or against government-cozy companies. One of the keys factors to sustain and increase China’s growth this century depends on its ability to attract capital. It doesn’t look good when the largest IT company does not want to work in China.

The success of China also depends on its ability to innovate. Historically, the culture has favored followers over leaders. While this is slowly changing, companies like Google are a positive influence on the Chinese work culture because the company promotes a culture of innovation, research, and transparency. What this means is that it values risk-takers and creative minds. Working at Google gives many Chinese researchers, programmers, and managers an opportunity to engage with companies that have different protocols and values than local Chinese companies.

And lastly, collaboration is critical for innovation. If Google and the Chinese government cannot work through this together, then China would be signaling to the world that it just pushed out one of the world’s most innovative IT companies. If Google stays in China, it should think about how to become a leader for IT innovation in China. Some good ideas to consider can be found in Isaac Mao’s open letter to Google to “save [the] Internet in China.” Mao suggests that Google create a VC fund, develop anti-censorship tools, and improve Adsense. I am a big fan of his first suggestion of creating a VC fund as a way to nurture new Chinese IT companies. This is an excellent idea that would infuse the market with innovative companies that are more closely aligned with Google’s culture. With Google running a R&D like VC fund, it would diversify the players in the Chinese internet landscape, increase Google’s industry alliances, and nurture its ties to other IT leaders that may have deeper connections to other sectors

Whatever the outcome, we should not be misled to think that everyone is on the same page in the Chinese government. Like all large institutions, there are different alliances and divergent opinions. The Chinese government is not a unified front that necessarily agrees across all levels on its censorship policies. I believe that there is a lot of opportunity for change. I worked with a lot of smart and open minded people who were willing to explore different positions. The question is are those talented people in the position to bring things like innovation, competition, and collaboration together.

In the beginning of this post, I said that that if Google were to leave China, there would be no immediate impacts on the average Chinese internet user. However, the long-term impacts would be devastating. The Chinese IT industry would lose such a critical player. The Chinese government would appear more hostile towards international businesses and privacy protocols. The citizens of China would have less access to unfiltered information. And the world beyond China would lose a critical link to the country. I hope that a compromise can be reached.

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