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July 28, 2009

00 Birth Certificate Controversy is “Made-Up Fictional Nonsense”

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 5:16 am

Gibbs: Birth Certificate Controversy is “Made-Up Fictional Nonsense”

July 27, 2009 3:18 PM

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Whether by Snopes, Politifact, or Factcheck.org, those in the business of gauging the truth have definitively stated that President Obama was born in the U.S., in Honolulu, Hawaii, on August 4, 1961.

The campaign last year provided a copy of his certificate of live birth, as issued by the state of Hawaii.

Last October, Hawaii state health director Dr. Chiyome Fukino issued a statement: “There have been numerous requests for Sen. Barack Hussein Obama’s official birth certificate. State law prohibits the release of a certified birth certificate to persons who do not have a tangible interest in the vital record. Therefore I, as director of health for the state of Hawaii, along with the registrar of Vital Statistics who has statutory authority to oversee and maintain these type of vital records, have personally seen and verified that the Hawaii State Department of Health has Sen. Obama’s original birth certificate on record in accordance with state policies and procedures.”

Both of Honolulu’s major newspapers, the Advertiser and the Star Bulletin have provided, from their archives, birth announcements from that week: “Mr. and Mrs. Barack H. Obama, 6085 Kalanianaole Highway, son, Aug. 4.”

And yet, for whatever reason, some persist in believing that the President, despite all evidence to the contrary, was born outside the U.S.

Today at the White House briefing, press secretary Robert Gibbs was asked by liberal talk radio host Bill Press if there was anything he could say to make the “birthers” go away.

“No,” he said. “The God’s honest truth is no.”

Gibbs said he almost hesitated to even bring it up in the “august” setting of the White House press room, and then decried the “made-up fictional nonsense of whether or not the president was born in this country.”

“If I had some DNA it wouldn’t assuage those who don’t believe he was born here,” Gibbs said, talking about how he posted the president’s birth certificate on-line last year to make the story go away, to no avail. “The President was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, the 50th state of the greatest country on the face of the earth.”

Gibbs said there were 10,000 more important issues than to be debating a the president’s citizenship, “which has been proven ad nauseam.”

Why does it keep coming up? Gibbs was asked.

“Because for $15 you can get an internet address and say whatever you want,” Gibbs said.

And yet this is a story that persists – aided in no small way, White House officials say, by Republican members of Congress who have introduced legislation to require future presidential candidates to present copies of their birth certificates “to establish that the candidate meets the qualifications.”

“What you’re doing is appeasing the nutcases,” Chris Matthews said to Rep. John Campbell, R-Calif., one of the legislators in question. “You’re verifying the paranoia out there.” He held up the copy of the birth certificate provided last year by the Obama campaign and told Campbell to “mail this birth certificate to the wacko wing of your party.”

Asked about the birthers, Liz Cheney on CNN last week tried to explain the sentiment, saying, “one of the reasons you see people so concerned about this is people are uncomfortable” to have a “President so reluctant to defend the nation overseas.” People are “uncomfortable with an American president who seems afraid to defend America.”

James Carville said Cheney “refuses to say this is ludicrous because she actually wants to encourage these people to believe this.”

Other Republican congressmen clearly find it a nuisance. Here’s Rep. Mike Castle, R-Del., trying to talk to Sussex County citizens about health care reform.

Conservative talk radio host Michael Medved today told NPR’s On Point that “conservatives need to speak out against it and be clear and not play games like Liz Cheney was doing. It is a fringe movement which is now poisoning and threatening the Republican Party.”

If nothing else, the issue has provided fodder for The Daily Show:

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart Mon – Thurs 11p / 10c
The Born Identity
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show
Full Episodes
Political Humor Joke of the Day

…but to many in the White House it’s no joking matter.
-jpt

July 27, 2009 | Permalink | Share | User Comments (348)

July 27, 2009

00 AAAI Presidential Panel on Long-Term AI Futures

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 5:33 pm

AAAI Presidential Panel on Long-Term AI Futures

2008-2009 Study

Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Co-chairs: Eric Horvitz and Bart Selman

Panel: Margaret Boden, Craig Boutilier, Greg Cooper, Tom Dean, Tom Dietterich, Oren Etzioni, Barbara Grosz, Eric Horvitz, Toru Ishida, Sarit Kraus, Alan Mackworth, David McAllester, Sheila McIlraith, Tom Mitchell, Andrew Ng, David Parkes, Edwina Rissland, Bart Selman, Diana Spears, Peter Stone, Milind Tambe, Sebastian Thrun, Manuela Veloso, David Waltz, Michael Wellman

Terms of Reference

The AAAI President has commissioned a study to explore and address potential long-term societal influences of AI research and development. The panel will consider the nature and timing of potential AI successes, and will define and address societal challenges and opportunities in light of these potential successes. On reflecting about the long term, panelists will review expectations and uncertainties about the development of increasingly competent machine intelligences, including the prospect that computational systems will achieve “human-level” abilities along a variety of dimensions, or surpass human intelligence in a variety of ways. The panel will appraise societal and technical issues that would likely come to the fore with the rise of competent machine intelligence. For example, how might AI successes in multiple realms and venues lead to significant or perhaps even disruptive societal changes?

The committee’s deliberation will include a review and response to concerns about the potential for loss of human control of computer-based intelligences and, more generally, the possibility for foundational changes in the world stemming from developments in AI. Beyond concerns about control, the committee will reflect about potential socioeconomic, legal, and ethical issues that may come with the rise of competent intelligent computation, the changes in perceptions about machine intelligence, and likely changes in human-computer relationships.

In addition to projecting forward and making predictions about outcomes, the panel will deliberate about actions that might be taken proactively over time in the realms of preparatory analysis, practices, or machinery so as to enhance long-term societal outcomes.

On issues of control and, more generally, on the evolving human-computer relationship, writings, such as those by statistician I.J. Good on the prospects of an “intelligence explosion” followed up by mathematician/science fiction author Vernor Vinge’s writings on the inevitable march towards an AI “singularity,” propose that major changes might flow from the unstoppable rise of powerful computational intelligences. Popular movies have portrayed computer-based intelligence to the public with attention-catching plots centering on the loss of control of intelligent machines. Well-known science fiction stories have included reflections (e.g., the “Laws of Robotics” described in Asimov’s Robot Series) on the need for and value of establishing behavioral rules for autonomous systems. Discussion, media, and anxieties about AI in the public and scientific realms highlight the value of investing more thought as a scientific community on preceptions, expectations, and concerns about long-term futures for AI. The committee will study and discuss these issues and will address in their report the myths and potential realities of anxieties about long-term futures. Beyond reflection about the validity of such concerns by scientists and lay public about disruptive futures, the panel will reflect about the value of formulating guidelines for guiding research and of creating policies that might constrain or bias the behaviors of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems so as to address concerns.

Focus groups:

  • Pace, Concerns, Control, GuidelinesChair: David McAllester
  • Potentially Disruptive Advances: Nature and timingChair: Milind Tambe
  • Ethical and Legal ChallengesChair: David Waltz

July 24, 2009

00 Conceptual Summary of Project

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 1:40 am

HistoryCommons

Conceptual Summary of Project

Derek Mitchell and Michael Tuck

The History Commons is a social media website that provides a online space where Internet users can collaborate in the documentation of historical events. We refer to users who add material to the History Commons database as “contributors” or “authors;” more experienced users become “editors” as well. The History Commons (HC) is people-powered and people-driven, as opposed to being driven by powerful entities that represent a very narrow band of society. Contributors to HC work together to build an online documented version of the historical record. It is a socially and politically significant exercise because it has the potential to create a version of the historical narrative that is written by a wider swath of society, and therefore serves a broader scope of interests. It is a narrative that is less subject to control by the dominant sectors of society. Contributors participate for a variety of reasons. In most cases they are people who have an acute interest in politics and who have a perspective on history and current events that is in conflict with the narrative that is broadcast by powerful interests such as governments and the major media networks. They write because they want to create a written record of alternative narratives that checks the power of these interests. This is a key element of the History Commons’ “people-driven” nature, where the diverse contributions of its users make it possible to produce a record that transcends particular ideological and social agendas.

The History Commons is not unique because it offers a space where individuals can challenge mainstream narratives. Blogs, alternative media organizations, and other products of the New Media revolution also do this. What makes the History Commons website unique is the fact that it does this differently. Blogs and news articles represent the observations and ideas of a specific moment. Such documents are critically important to understanding events; however, they generally are not ideal for getting a current overview of a certain issue or event since such sources quickly become outdated. This is where HC provides a invaluable service to the public. The History Commons is unique because it offers its contributors a means to connect the dots in a chronological fashion that can be sliced and diced according to a number of different criteria. Other sites have made attempts at doing this, but from our experience, they lack the focus and extensive, comprehensive array of information that we do. Some such sites have an overt partisan or ideological viewpoint.

The event summaries in our database are continually updated as new information surfaces. As such they are extremely useful for people who need a basic understanding of an event, as well as for researchers who are looking for a good secondary source where they can begin their research. The History Commons is not a primary source of information, but it does provide a comprehensive information base from hundreds, sometimes thousands, of sources, cataloged and arrayed in chronological form. This is a tremendously useful resource for historians, authors, researchers, and the like, as documented in the user comments we have received. Since the database is comprehensive and searchable, and because each entry is cumulative, the History Commons website makes it quite easy for people to acquire a basic understanding of events within a short timeframe.

Comparison to Wikipedia

Wikipedia is a very popular site that boasts some of the same features as the History Commons. Its structure and contributor base makes it one of the most useful, comprehensive, and easily accessible, encyclopedic sources of information on the Internet. However, where it pales in comparison with the History Commons is its its ability to present information in a larger context. Wikipedia excels in presenting individual snippets of information. It does not present information in a larger contextual continuum centered on a specific topic. This is the heart of the History Commons’s unique function. Visitors to the History Commons website find timelines, not articles. It Wikipedia does attempt to present such contextual relations between its entries, in its “related topics” and other features. However, the number of Wikipedia visitors who use this function is relatively small, and the Wikipedia design does not lend itself to these features functioning with ease and efficiency. The History Commons is structured to make this feature a central function of our application. It is our interconnectivity that makes us unique, and uniquely useful.

How it Works

The History Commons timelines are compiled and structured by the HC web application from people-created event summaries in the Commons database. The user can choose to view timelines that consist of events chosen on the basis of a number of different criteria — topics, regions, entities that participated in the events, “projects” (collections of entries compiled by contributors), and so on. And these timelines are powerful as they feature quick cross references between events and entities. For example, a user can click an entity tag (an entity such as a person or corporation that participated in an event) and the web app will generate a timeline showing all events in the database in which that entity participated. There are also timeline tags. Timeline tags are links to user-created timelines that also contain that focus event. One of the most powerful features of the History Commons web application is the “context timeline.” When a user clicks the context link, the History Commons application generates a timeline that consists of all events that are related to the focus event. Context timelines are scalable. A context timeline with a low scale number usually only includes a small number of events, but ones that are very closely related to the focus event. Timelines with larger scale numbers includes events that are more distantly related. Thusly, the user is able to conduct a finely tuned search for specific information regarding a specific entity or event, or can launch a more broad-based search for information of wider interest.

Contributors write summaries of events, add the sources and related entities, specifies topics, regions, and other meta data, and indicates which user-defined timeline they want the event to be added to. Anonymous users can not edit existing entries or add new ones. The user then saves this event as a draft or submits it for approval. Other, more experienced users then review the entries and approve or reject them.

Everything that is published in the History Commons is peer-reviewed before it appears on screen for visitors to use. Here is another area in which HC does not display the problems associated with Wikipedia — the anonymous, partisan edit. Wikipedia has secondary, after-the fact peer reviews; contributors make whatever changes they like that appear instantly, and peers come behind them and make changes if needed. On controversial issues, events, or persons, this can and does quickly degenerate into a back-and-forth conflict, with users making unacceptable changes, Wikipedia personnel undoing changes, and so on, over and over again, until the page is locked down or restricted. This does not serve the user’s best interests. Everything we publish goes through a peer review process with at least three people reading and reviewing the material before users see it.

There are three steps to the review process. After an entry is submitted, it is reviewed for content to ensure that it is well-written and well-sourced. Sources are checked to ensure that what is in the entry accurately reflects the source material without resorting to plagiarism. An entry approved for content is then submitted for copyediting, using the HC style manual as a guide. If the event is rejected during the first step, it is sent back to the user, who reads over the comments and then resubmits the entry. If it is approved, another user, who is in charge of managing the user-defined timeline that the event was submitted to, then makes a decision whether or not the verified event should be added to the timeline. Each event is thoroughly reviewed for accuracy and proper grammar and spelling.

Technologies

The current version of the History Commons web application is written in Java, driven by a MySQL database accessed through JDO, and runs on Tomcat. The presentation layer is done in JSP using a templating system called Bricks. Subversion is being used for version controlling while Trac is being used to manage tickets and documentation. The coding structure serves its purpose, but is limited, out-of-date, idiosyncratic, and inefficient. HC administrators, project managers, and contributors have created a large and varied list of proposed improvements to better enable contributors to add material to the system, and vastly increase the usability and efficiency of the system.

Development History

  • 2004-early 2006 — Mike Bevin, a Java programmer from New Zealand, created the application in his free time. He had no intention of turning this into a big project, and the demands from all the contributors for new features and bug fixes, quickly burned him out. The demands for new features also meant less time for refactoring.
  • Late 2006 through Mid-2007 — Since no one was developing, by this time functional limitations and bugs had become a huge bottleneck. With History Commons having a tight budget, Executive Director Derek Mitchell took it upon himself to learn Java, and over the next year fixed more than a hundred bugs and implemented many new features. While modifying the system he learned about design patterns and basic architecture modeling principles; since then he has continued his study of Java and programming, and written a new application for the system.
  • Now — History Commons now has a stable functioning application, but additional work remains to be done to support our plans for additional features and functionality.

Going Forward

  • Hire a social media expert to help us conceptually design an interface and architecture that will attract active users
  • Hire a company to design the user interface so that it is intuitive and usable
  • Hire someone to produce a professional design that compliments the website’s purpose
  • Hire a company to implement the design using valid, standards-based CSS, Javascript, and HTML
  • Hire a company to develop the application

Some of these functions can possibly be done by volunteers, but we want something efficient, attractive, and usable; this requires professionally created products.

Possible New Features and Improvements

New Features

  • Make it more social — allow comments, and people to maintain profiles that have more features.
  • Develop an open-source PHP application that anyone could use to create timelines for their own website. The app would allow them to submit copies of the timeline entries they create to the History Commons. From the user point of view, they have an app that allows them to create timelines. Submitting to the History Commons database would require little extra effort.
  • Archiving of sources — when a user cites a source, the webapp caches it.
  • Favorite/Recently used/Most Frequently Used sources — makes it easy for people to use sources that they frequently use.
  • Allow people to mark entries as favorites and group together in their own user-defined timelines. There would be links to these timelines on their profiles.
  • Create graphical representation of the timelines.
  • Create an investigation process, e.g., Step 1 — Create Timelines, Step 2. Submit entire timelines to peer review, Step 3. Create a report that summarizes findings and offers conclusions. Findings would be published as a report and be accompanied with a Flash-based animation that summarizes timeline. This would be published on the Commons, Youtube, etc. as an easy way to publicize the information to a broader audience. The Center for Grassroots Oversight, the History Commons’s parent organization, would provide funds to hire someone to create the Flash animation.

Improvements

  • Allow anonymous editing and submissions.
  • Improved submission process (would be a challenge)
  • Better way to organize content, better taxonomy. Perhaps using tags or something…
  • new schema. The concept of a “project” is difficult for people to grasp in the context of our website. One suggestions is that a “Project”, which we define as a group of timelines that a group of people collaborate on, be instead referred to as a “group”, which would refer instead to the people involved. But each group would still focus on a narrow subject scope.

Conclusion

We feel that the History Commons provides a uniquely valuable resource for authors, researchers, students, and anyone interested in gathering information about social and political events in a larger, more expansive context. History Commons provides a resource unlike any other of which we are aware. However, HC has fundamental technological problems that prevent us from fully serving the population. We know what needs to be done, and how to do it. Currently we lack the funding and the human resources to make it happen.

These upgrades require a significant investment of time and money; if you would like to support this project by making a contribution, or if you know of possible funding sources, click here.

1 Comment »

  1. […] community, History Commons 2.0 We’ve written a new conceptual summation for the Commons: you can read it here (there’s also a link in the […]

    Pingback by Conceptual Summary for the History Commons « HistoryCommons — July 17, 2009 @ 12:38 am | Reply

July 23, 2009

00 Tomgram: An American Hell

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 11:54 pm

A Regular Antidote to the Mainstream Media

July 23, 2009
Tomgram: An American Hell

Don’t Turn the Page on History
Facing the American World We Created
By Tom Engelhardt

We’ve just passed through the CIA assassination flap, already fading from the news after less than two weeks of media attention. Broken in several major newspapers, here’s how the story goes: the Agency, evidently under Vice President Dick Cheney’s orders, didn’t inform Congress that, to assassinate al-Qaeda leaders, it was trying to develop and deploy global death squads. (Of course, just about no one is going to call them that, but the description fits.) Congress is now in high dudgeon. The CIA didn’t keep that body’s “Gang of Eight” informed. A House investigation is now underway.

We’re told that the CIA — being the president’s private army and part of the executive branch of our government — has committed a heinous dereliction of duty. In fact, not keeping key congressional figures up to date on the developing program could even “be illegal,” according to Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin. (Not that Congress, when informed of Bush administration extreme acts, ever did much of anything anyway.)

This story, however, has a largely unexplored strangeness to it that has only been discussed on the fringes of the mainstream media (or in the press of other countries). After all, during the eight years this CIA assassination program was supposedly in formation, U.S. military special ops death squads were, as far as we can tell, freely roaming the planet conducting (or botching) assassination missions, and the CIA’s own robot assassins, airborne death squads, were also launching operations — sometimes wiping out innocent civilians — from Yemen and Somalia to Pakistan. They continue to run such operations in the skies over the Pakistani tribal borderlands near Afghanistan. So we still await an explanation of just why the CIA spent close to eight years, under Vice Presidential oversight, getting its death squads almost operational, but never — we’re told — off the ground.

If there seems to be something odd about this latest flap, if there’s much that we don’t know yet, we do, at least, know one thing: This particular small splash from the previous administration’s deep dive into crime and folly will have its brief time in the media sun and then be swallowed up by oblivion, just as each of the previous flaps has been.

After all, can you honestly tell me that you think often about the CIA torture flap, the CIA-destruction-of-interrogation-video-tapes flap, the what-did-Congress/Nancy Pelosi-really-know-about-torture-methods flap, the Bush-administration-officials-(like-Condi-Rice)-signed-off-on-torture-methods-in-2002-even-before-the-Justice-Department-justified-them flap, the National-Security-Agency-(it-was-far-more-widespread-than-anyone-imagined)-electronic-surveillance flap, the should-the-NSA’s-telecom-spies-be-investigated-and-prosecuted-for-engaging-in-illegal-warrantless-wiretapping flap, the should-CIA-torturers-be-investigated-and-prosecuted-for-using-enhanced-interrogation-techniques flap, the Abu-Ghraib-photos-(round-two)-suppression flap, or various versions of the can-they-close-Guantanamo, will-they-keep-detainees-in-prison-forever flaps, among others that have already disappeared into my own personal oblivion file? Every flap it’s day, evidently. Each flap another problem (again we’re told) for a president with an ambitious program who is eager to “look forward, not backward.”

Of course, he’s not alone. Given the last eight years of disaster piled on catastrophe, who in our American world would want to look backward? The urge to turn the page in this country is palpable, but — just for a moment — let’s not.

Click here to read more of this dispatch.

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00 Pakistan: Now or Never?

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 6:05 pm

Reuters Blogs

Pakistan: Now or Never?

Perspectives on Pakistan

July 21st, 2009

The virtues of doing nothing: Why focusing on Afghanistan’s opium makes the opium problem worse

Posted by: Joshua Foust
Tags: Pakistan: Now or Never, , ,

Joshua Foust is an American military analyst. He blogs about Central Asia and Afghanistan at Registan.net . Reuters is not responsible for the content – the views are the author’s alone.

It would be an understatement to call opium cultivation in Afghanistan America’s headache. The issue of illegal drug cultivation and smuggling has vexed policymakers for three decades, and led to a multi-billion dollar campaign to combat the phenomenon.

Opium causes all of our problems, so they say—according to a factsheet at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (pdf), opium creates instability, funds the insurgency, and wreaks havoc on the government. They’re not alone – entire books have been written on the subject.

The blame game on opium, however, ignores a critical – and quite uncomfortable – fact: it misses the point. The reality is, while the cultivation of opium does not help matters from a Western perspective, in Afghanistan it is actually a healthy economic activity. The concerns over its cultivation, too, are overblown: even a brief look at the numbers show it to be at best a trailing indicator of insecurity, insurgency, corruption, and economic malaise. Opium, therefore, is only an indicator of other, more substantial problems.

Consider, for example, what I call The Nangarhar Swing. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, in 2005 Nangarhar produced nearly 1/5 of Afghanistan’s opium, but was virtually poppy-free in 2006. 2007 saw a 285 percent increase (pdf) in cultivation, making the province one of the country’s top poppy producers. Yet in 2008, it was once again virtually poppy-free (pdf). This shift cannot be tied only to security, as many like to claim: according to the violence statistics compiled by the Long War Journal, even as Nangarhar has stopped the large scale cultivation of opium, it has become steadily more violent. Moreover, there are many other areas of the country, like Khost province along the border with Pakistan, or Kunar province further north, where the insurgency has become worse even as those provinces were emptied of opium.

The discrepancy is really a trick of language: When the UNODC declares a province poppy-free, what they mean is, production there is “negligible”, not non-existent. Whether that is in the context of total production, other provinces, or some sort of absolute number (a percentage of arable land or total worldwide opium production) isn’t really clear. In Nangarhar, several times declared “poppy free” by the UNODC, there remain active opium eradication missions in outlying districts such as Sherzad. What’s noteworthy about it is not the presence of some fairly smallish opium farms in southwestern Nangarhar, as most opium farms are small family affairs. What is interesting is the density of the farms. In a single 5 km stretch of the countryside, teams found and destroyed 100 poppy fields. For a supposedly poppy-free province, that is simply stunning.

It also covers up the substantial effect of destroying the opium economy. In many parts of Afghanistan, opium is the economy, and the World Bank estimated in 2008 it accounts for 1/3 of the country’s economy. In opium-adjacent communities, opium funds underpin the entire local economy: especially in the opium “heartland” in the South, the only way for small farmers to get microcredit loans or deal with exporters is through opium traders. Through a system of loans called salaam, they in essence create informal futures markets on crops… but only opium. Cereal crops and fruits, or other licit agriculture, are not included in this system (even though it is possible for other actors, whether the government or NGOs, to provide this service). In fact, the ways these markets have developed in the south is remarkably similar to how informal credit markets formed in rural medieval Europe. It is normal. The West just happens to dislike the crop.

But even in opium “success stories”, there are significant problems to simply removing the crop. In Nangarhar, the wild swings in opium prices and cultivation crashed the rural economy again and again. Most of the microcredit salaam loans farmers take out are not denominated in any currency – they pay in opium. So, when prices crash or an eradication team sweeps through, farmers become trapped in a horrendous debt cycle where the only means of escape is to grow yet more opium. There are even rumors of farmers selling a daughter or son to the traffickers in payment, and many families have fled to either Iran or Pakistan to avoid reprisals for unpaid opium debt.

There is a more fundamental economic problem to growing poppy, however: areas that grow opium actually tend to be the wealthiest. Sherzad District in Nangarhar, where there is still opium cultivation and eradication, actually has relatively high income compared to the rest of Nangarhar. According to the International Monetary Fund (pdf), when Nangarhar province saw a huge drop in opium cultivation in 2005/6, province-wide GDP was about $1.3 billion (which was a big drop from the year before, when there was much more opium). The next year, 2006/7, when opium production spiked 285%, province-level GDP rose to $3.2 billion, only to fall the next year to $1.8 billion as the UNODC declared it poppy-free.

So what is to be done? The Obama administration has wisely recognized that opium eradication is a non-starter, and does far more harm than the marginal good of destroying some opium crops. UNODC Chief Antonio Maria Costa recently agreed, and suggested a “flood of drugs” in its place. Under this plan, somehow the borders of Afghanistan would be sealed so that no drugs can “escape”, in their words, thus crashing the price of opium. Feasible or not, Costa’s idea at least tries to examine other ways of reducing the need for opium cultivation. Looking at opium cultivation as an economic factor, however, leads one to many other conclusions that are inconvenient for a political and military apparatus designed to oppose the very idea of drug cultivation.

If opium is an economic puzzle, and not a political-military one, then there should be an economic (or at least non-military) solution to it. Several years ago, the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit published a study (pdf) comparing the factors behind the cultivation of opium in adjacent provinces in the “poppy-free” north. Water shortages, soil moisture and salinity, severe socioeconomic inequality driving food insecurity, a poor presence of formal institutions, all have decisive impacts on a household decision whether or not to cultivate opium.

More recently, a team of Norwegian researchers has noted a strong causation between violence and opium cultivation, but not in the way most think: in their research paper (pdf), they assert that opium follows conflict, and not the other way around. In other words, opium cultivation is simply a feature of ungoverned conflict zones, and especially in Afghanistan, something people do as a last resort when other economic activities fail to provide for their families.

Taken together, these studies (and the many others like them—this is a growing field of study) point to a counterintuitive conclusion: do nothing. That is, focusing only on opium misses the point, and doesn’t address the reasons why it is grown. If opium cultivation were an indicator of an ungoverned or contested space, then that would indicate that making that space governed and uncontested would also address the opium.

There are a few examples even within Afghanistan where governance and security came first, and then opium cultivation simply dropped off. Badakhshan province was the only province in the country that was completely Taliban-free in 2001, and as a result was the only one to grow opium in any really measurable amount during the Taliban’s prohibition. Since the American invasion, it has remained mostly quiet, and has seen a growing success in both trade connections to neighboring areas and better governance by multiple levels of officials. As an aid worker active there told me recently, “the price of poppy has fallen fastest in the north (where the poppy has a lower morphine content), and in Badakhshan, farmers can already make more from okra or onions than opium.” Selling vegetables is relatively low risk and carries a good profit margin – something that cannot be said for the majority of Afghanistan’s non-subsistence farmers.

Drug traffickers have taken enormous measures to lower the risk of drug cultivation, but the development community has not taken the time to do so for legal agriculture. It remains prohibitively expensive to ship anything out of Afghanistan, and border politics especially with Pakistan (one worker recently complained that difficulties in crossing the border into Pakistan meant an entire crop of potatoes from Khost province rotted at the border crossing, unsold) keep export-driven agriculture uncertain and extremely risky. By focusing so much of its energies onto eradication or somehow controlling the cultivation of opium, both the International Community and the government of Afghanistan have ignored providing other ways for farmers to make money legally – even when Alternative Livelihood programs exist in an area, they’re poorly administered and often barely make a dent in the local economy.

So why not do nothing? Opium is not Afghanistan’s biggest problem – it is horrendous poverty, bad infrastructure and no security. When it comes to all three problems, Afghanistan faces two major hurdles – underinvestment (money, equipment, education, health, and security) and corruption-driven illegitimacy. Making matters worse, the overwhelming majority of aid in the country flows outside government channels or oversight, which undercuts Kabul’s legitimacy even among the people it helps.

Focusing only on opium, therefore, doesn’t actually focus on the more fundamental problems facing the country. It is an obsession on symptoms, while the causes go unaddressed. The missing piece of governance, and with it the development of the necessary institutions of society and economy, is the critically ignored piece of almost all plans to eliminate opium in Afghanistan. And as examples like Badakhshan have shown, when even moderate progress is made on these fronts, people will voluntarily switch to growing other crops, and they will make enough money to support themselves. It’s enough to make one wonder just why there needs to be a plan in the first place. It’s counterintuitive, but scrapping the West’s counternarcotics policies is surest way to actually achieve the counternarcotics goal of a poppy-free Afghanistan.

(Reuters photos: Opium fields in Farah province/Goran Tomasevic)

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