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June 30, 2012

05 Euro-Gipfel: Die Klügere gab nach

Filed under: economía,future,Holístico,política — fores @ 12:28 am
29.06.2012 12:45

 

Euro-Gipfel Die Klügere gab nach

Ein Kommentar von Christian Rickens

Merkel, Monti, Van Rompuy beim EU-Gipfel: Kompromisse, ziemlich kluge sogarREUTERS

Merkel, Monti, Van Rompuy beim EU-Gipfel: Kompromisse, ziemlich kluge sogar

In der langen Nacht von Brüssel hat Angela Merkel deutsche Positionen aufgegeben – aber überwiegend solche, die ohnehin unhaltbar waren. Im Gegenzug gewährt sie Monti einen Sieg, den der italienische Ministerpräsident innenpolitisch dringend braucht.

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Es wäre so einfach: Angela Merkel gibt deutsche Interessen vorschnell preis. Merkel unterliegt den Südstaaten. Merkel verzockt unser Geld in der langen Nacht von Brüssel. Klar, das sind die Sätze, die sich anbieten, nachdem die Kanzlerin beim Gipfel der europäischen Regierungschefs weitreichende Zugeständnisse gemacht hat.

Der Rettungsschirm ESM soll künftig auch direkt Banken unterstützen können – das könnte vor allem Spanien helfen, denn so werden die ESM-Hilfen nicht mehr auf die spanische Schuldenlast angerechnet. Und Staaten sollen nun Geld aus dem Rettungsschirm erhalten können, ohne im Gegenzug ein strenges Überwachungsprogramm zu akzeptieren – das hilft vor allem Italien. Das hochverschuldete Land hat nun zumindest die theoretische Option, ESM-Geld zu beantragen, ohne sich dem Troika-Kuratel zu unterwerfen.Angesichts der vorab unablässig wiederholten deutschen Position “keine gemeinsame Haftung ohne gemeinsame Kontrolle” klingen diese beiden Punkte nach einer Niederlage Merkels. Tatsächlich hat die Kanzlerin jedoch keine Position geräumt, die nicht ohnehin unhaltbar war. Und sie wird mit dem Junktim aus Fiskal- und Wachstumspakt eine wichtige Gegenleistung erhalten.

Es macht ja nun auch wirklich keinen Sinn, Spanien billiges Geld für seine Bankenrettung zu leihen – nur um damit den Schuldenstand des Staates so weit zu erhöhen, dass das Land anschließend für seine eigenen Anleihen deutlich höhere Zinsen zahlen muss. Doch direktes Geld an die Banken soll auch erst dann fließen, wenn eine wirksame Europäische Bankenaufsicht installiert ist. Das wird dauern.

Was die Überwachung angeht: Das Beispiel Griechenland zeigt, dass gerade in den wirklichen Problemstaaten auch strenge und detaillierte Sparauflagen nicht weiterhelfen, wenn es im Land selbst am Willen und den Fähigkeiten zur Umsetzung mangelt.

Wenn bei der Ratifizierung alles glattgeht, hat Merkel mit dem Fiskalpakt in Zukunft ohnehin ein Instrument in der Hand, das gerade hochverschuldeten Staaten wie Italien extrem strenge Sparauflagen macht. Wie Deutschland muss auch Italien in Zukunft praktisch ohne neue Schulden auskommen – Italiens Haushaltsdefizit lag 2011 bei 3,9 Prozent der Wirtschaftsleistung. Zudem muss Italien seinen Gesamtschuldenstand von 120 Prozent der Wirtschaftsleistung zügig auf 60 Prozent halbieren. Ein gewaltige Aufgabe – und nur wenn Italien sie erfüllt, kann das Land billiges Geld aus dem ESM erhalten.

So ein drastisches Spardiktat hätte keine Troika in Rom jemals durchsetzen können.

Der Kanzlerin dürfte auch klar sein: Besser als mit den Ministerpräsidenten Mario Monti in Rom und Mariano Rajoyin Madrid könnte sie in der Euro-Krise gar nicht bedient sein. Beide haben wegen ihres Reformkurses mit kräftigem innenpolitischen Gegenwind zu kämpfen, in Italien stehen im kommenden Frühjahr Wahlen an. Es war wichtig, Monti in Brüssel öffentlichkeitswirksam einen Punkt landen zu lassen.

Merkels Zugeständnisse werden mehr als wieder aufgewogen durch einen diplomatischen Sieg, den sie bereits im Vorfeld des Gipfels errungen hat: Sie hat es tatsächlich geschafft, dem sozialistischen französischen Präsidenten François Hollande einen angeblich 130 Milliarden schweren Wachstumspakt als gleichwertiges Gegengewicht zu dem in Paris so ungeliebten Fiskalpakt zu verkaufen. Dabei besteht dieser Wachtumspakt aus wenig mehr als Luftbuchungen und Hoffnungswerten. Er wird zwar nicht mehr Wachstum für Europa bringen, aber immerhin auch kein deutsches Geld kosten.

Eingeknickt, verzockt, nationale Interessen preisgegeben: Wenn sich jemand diese Vorwürfe nach seiner Heimkehr vom EU-Gipfel zurecht gefallen lassen muss, dann ist es der französische Präsident, nicht die deutsche Kanzlerin. Merkel hat in der vergangenen Nacht nur das gemacht, was in der europäischen Politik seit jeher zum Handwerk zählt: Kompromisse. Ziemlich kluge sogar.

June 21, 2012

05 Top US universities put their reputations online

Filed under: economía,future,Holístico,politics & literature — fores @ 2:17 am

20 June 2012 Last updated at 13:42 ET

Top US universities put their reputations online

By Sean Coughlan BBC News education correspondent

Anant Agarwal from MIT and Stanford’s Andrew Ng are designing an online future.

This autumn more than a million students are going to take part in an experiment that could re-invent the landscape of higher education.

Some of the biggest powerhouses in US higher education are offering online courses – testing how their expertise and scholarship can be brought to a global audience.

Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have formed a $60m (£38m) alliance to launch edX, a platform to deliver courses online – with the modest ambition of “revolutionising education around the world”.

Sounding like a piece of secret military hardware, edX will provide online interactive courses which can be studied by anyone, anywhere, with no admission requirements and, at least at present, without charge.

With roots in Silicon Valley, Stanford academics have set up another online platform, Coursera, which will provide courses from Stanford and Princeton and other leading US institutions.

The first president of edX is Anant Agarwal, director of MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory and one of the pioneers of the MITx online prototype.

He puts forward a statistic that encapsulates the game-changing potential.

The first online course from MITx earlier this year had more students than the entire number of living students who have graduated from the university.

In fact, it isn’t far from the total of all the students who have ever been there since the 19th Century.

‘Tipping point’

The internet provides an unparalleled capacity to expand the reach – but it also raises far-reaching and thorny questions for the traditional model of a university.

Harvard Harvard, birthplace of Facebook, has joined a project to put courses as well as social lives online

“We’ve crossed the tipping point,” says Professor Agarwal. The courses being launched in the autumn, he anticipates, will have at least 500,000 students – and probably many more.

As an example of how courses might be delivered, the MITx prototype taught an electronics course using an interactive virtual laboratory, e-textbooks, online discussions and video lectures.

Assessment of the course, which took 10 hours per week, was entirely automated.

“This could be the end of the two-hour lecture,” says Professor Agarwal. “You can’t hit the pause button on a lecturer, you can’t fast forward.”

Recorded lectures – available at the push of an iPad – could be more like text books, with universities using the best available.

Assessing large numbers of online learners raises a big practical challenge – and edX is a laboratory to see how this can be developed.

Michael Smith, dean of Harvard’s faculty of arts and sciences, describes the “incredibly important research opportunity” provided by edX.

“We will collect enormous amounts of data from the edX platform about how students are interacting with the courses and online tools and assessments.”

Degrees of degree

Professor Agarwal wants to include social sciences and humanities subjects, which would require free-text answers – and he raises ideas such as peer marking among students as one approach.

Coursera video lecture Video lecture from the Coursera online project, with content from Stanford

This might seem difficult now – but Professor Smith says online practices are constantly advancing.

“People interact with and receive information in new ways today, compared with even a few years ago. Universities like Harvard need to be in that space.”

Accrediting such courses is another tricky area.

The online courses are promised to be as rigorous as anything else from MIT or Harvard – but successful students will get a “certificate of mastery” and not a degree or any formal university credit. It’s being set at arm’s length from what’s on offer for the paying customers.

If students on campus are paying $50,000 (£32,000) per year, it’s going to be difficult to give away qualifications to online learners without charge.

High fees

The edX project has the good fortune to have two wealthy parent institutions – and getting a financial return won’t be a pressing necessity.

But Daphne Koller, co-founder of Coursera, says the expansion of online courses will raise difficult questions about what mainstream universities offer for such high fees.

Lecture hall Would lectures be better as online recordings that could be stopped and started?

Because if the content of university courses becomes freely available, what is it that students are paying for?

Is it the interactions with staff? Or is it the time with other students? Is it something to put on a CV?

“This is causing universities to rethink their value to students,” says Professor Koller, who is from Stanford University’s computer science department.

The most prestigious universities are always going to have enough demand for places – but the emergence of high-quality online courses could be tougher for middle-ranking institutions.

Why would you pay high fees to sit through a mediocre lecture, when you could go online and watch world experts at another university, even if it’s in another country?

“The universities in the middle will really have to think about their proposition,” she says.

Google economics

Professor Koller says Coursera will keep its content free by following the Silicon Valley approach of companies such as Google.

With large numbers of motivated, employable students – so far about 600,000 and rising – there are going to be plenty of opportunities and partnerships for revenue streams.

The online projects are also aimed at meeting the huge international demand for higher education.

In its initial stages, Coursera has acquired students in 190 countries. Outside the US, the biggest numbers are in the UK, Brazil, Russia and India.

“This is a real democratising influence, making a profound change. It will tap into unused talent,” says Professor Koller.

“Technology has got to the point where it’s feasible. We shouldn’t stratify society by who can afford access to education.”

Earlier this week, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation announced that it was giving $1m to MIT to use edX courses in partnership with colleges serving low-income students – which raises an intriguing possibility of bringing high-quality resources where they are most needed.

Of course there have already been online degrees and courses. The UK’s Open University has been a trailblazing pioneer of such distance learning. Stanford has also been experimenting.

In the US, large numbers of students have taken for-profit online degrees aimed at those unable to access campus-based courses.

But so far online projects have been in counterpoint to the mainstream.

Into the mainstream

The entry of such giants such as Harvard, Stanford and MIT means that it is coming into the centreground.

Student protest, Montreal, June 2012 Student protest in Montreal: The rising cost of university is an international issue

It is also a development that coincides with the growing accessibility of high-quality online video and devices such as iPads and smartphones.

There are already rich seams of free educational material online – such as on iTunes U – and this is increasingly being structured into something more formal.

But there are also warnings against under-estimating the challenges.

William Dutton, professor of internet studies at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, says universities have been experimenting with teaching online for a decade, but “it’s not there yet”.

“It’s much harder than teaching a class face-to-face,” he says.

It’s good that institutions such as MIT and Harvard are putting their shoulder to the wheel, he says, but so far no one has really worked out how to harness the internet for a university degree course.

Moral purpose

Professor Dutton also warns that the funding model of edX – subsidised by two very wealthy institutions – is not going to be affordable by many other universities.

But the idea of open learning has its own “moral purpose”, says Anka Mulder, head of Delft University in the Netherlands.

Dr Mulder is president of the OpenCourseWare group which advocates free online course materials.

The demand for higher education is growing, both in the developed and developing countries and Dr Mulder says it “can’t be achieved by building universities”.

She also argues that scepticism about whether courses can be delivered online – and worries about a lack of interaction – is being overtaken by changing social habits.

Talking and sharing online is no longer such a leap of the imagination.

“For the younger generation, the gap between online and real life is blurred,” she says.

Dr Mulder says that in five years most universities will be incorporating online learning in some form.

“Open learning is a movement that isn’t going to go away,” she says.

June 19, 2012

05 The Violent Visions of Slavoj Žižek

The Violent Visions of Slavoj Žižek

July 12, 2012

John Gray

Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism
by Slavoj Žižek
Verso, 1,038 pp., $69.95

Living in the End Times
by Slavoj Žižek
Verso, 504 pp., $22.95 (paper)

gray_1-071212.jpg

Reiner Riedler/Anzenberger/Redux

Slavoj Žižek at his apartment in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2010

Few thinkers illustrate the contradictions of contemporary capitalism better than the Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek. The financial and economic crisis has demonstrated the fragility of the free market system that its defenders believed had triumphed in the cold war; but there is no sign of anything resembling the socialist project that in the past was seen by many as embodying capitalism’s successor. Žižek’s work, which reflects this paradoxical situation in a number of ways, has made him one of the world’s best-known public intellectuals.

Born and educated in Ljubljana, the capital of the People’s Republic of Slovenia in the former Yugoslav federation until the federal state began to break up and Slovenia declared independence in 1990, Žižek has held academic positions in Britain, America, and Western Europe as well as in Slovenia. His prodigious output (over sixty volumes since his first book in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology, was published in 1989), innumerable articles and interviews, together with films such as Žižek! (2005) and The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema (2006), have given him a presence that extends far beyond the academy. Well attuned to popular culture, particularly film, he has a following among young people in many countries, including those of post-Communist Europe. He has a journal dedicated to his work—International Journal of Žižek Studies, founded in 2007—whose readership is registered via Facebook, and in October 2011 he addressed members of the Occupy movement in Zuccotti Park in New York, an event that was widely reported and can be viewed on YouTube.

Žižek’s wide influence does not mean that his philosophical and political standpoint can be easily defined. A member of the Communist Party of Slovenia until he resigned in 1988, Žižek had difficult relations with the Party authorities for many years owing to his interest in what they viewed as heterodox ideas. In 1990 he stood as a presidential candidate for Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, a party of the center left that was the dominant political force in the country for the rest of the decade; but liberal ideas, aside from serving as a reference point for positions he rejects, have never shaped his thinking.

Žižek was dismissed from his first university teaching post in the early 1970s, when the Slovenian authorities judged a thesis he had written on French structuralism—then an influential movement in anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and philosophy claiming that human thought and behavior exemplify a universal system of interrelated principles—to be “non-Marxist.” The episode demonstrated the limited nature of the intellectual liberalization that was being promoted in the country at the time, but Žižek’s later work suggests that the authorities were right in judging that his intellectual orientation was not Marxian. Throughout the enormous corpus of work he has since built up, Marx is criticized for being insufficiently radical in his rejection of existing modes of thought, while Hegel—a much greater influence on Žižek—is praised for being willing to lay aside classical logic in order to develop a more dialectical way of thinking. But Hegel is also criticized for having too great an attachment to traditional modes of reasoning, and a central theme of Žižek’s writings is the need to shed the commitment to intellectual objectivity that has guided radical thinkers in the past.

Žižek’s work sets itself in opposition to Marx on many issues. For all he owed to Hegelian metaphysics, Marx was also an empirical thinker who tried to frame theories about the actual course of historical development. It was not the abstract idea of revolution with which he was primarily concerned, but a revolutionary project involving specific and radical alterations in economic institutions and power relations.

Žižek shows little interest in these aspects of Marx’s thinking. Aiming “to repeat the Marxist ‘critique of political economy’ without the utopian-ideological notion of communism as its inherent standard,” he believes that “the twentieth-century communist project was utopian precisely insofar as it was not radical enough.” As Žižek sees it, Marx’s understanding of communism was partly responsible for this failure: “Marx’s notion of the communist society is itself the inherent capitalist fantasy; that is, a fantasmatic scenario for resolving the capitalist antagonisms he so aptly described.”

While he rejects Marx’s conception of communism, Žižek devotes none of the over one thousand pages of Less Than Nothing to specifying the economic system or institutions of government that would feature in a communist society of the kind he favors. In effect a compendium of Žižek’s work to date, Less Than Nothing is devoted instead to reinterpreting Marx by way of Hegel—one of the book’s sections is called “Marx as a Reader of Hegel, Hegel as a Reader of Marx”—and reformulating Hegelian philosophy by reference to the thought of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.

A “post-structuralist” who rejected the belief that reality can be captured in language, Lacan also rejected the standard interpretation of Hegel’s idea of “the cunning of reason,” according to which world history is the realization by oblique and indirect means of reason in human life. For Lacan as Žižek summarizes him, “The Cunning of Reason…in no way involves a faith in a secret guiding hand guaranteeing that all the apparent contingency of unreason will somehow contribute to the harmony of the Totality of Reason: if anything, it involves a trust in un-Reason.” On this Lacanian reading, the message of Hegel’s philosophy is not the progressive unfolding of rationality in history but instead the impotence of reason.

The Hegel that emerges in Žižek’s writings thus bears little resemblance to the idealist philosopher who features in standard histories of thought. Hegel is commonly associated with the idea that history has an inherent logic in which ideas are embodied in practice and then left behind in a dialectical process in which they are transcended by their opposites. Drawing on the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, Žižek radicalizes this idea of dialectic to mean the rejection of the logical principle of noncontradiction, so that rather than seeing rationality at work in history, Hegel rejects reason itself as it has been understood in the past. Implicit in Hegel (according to Žižek) is a new kind of “paraconsistent logic” in which a proposition “is not really suppressed by its negation.” This new logic, Žižek suggests, is well suited to understanding capitalism today. “Is not ‘postmodern’ capitalism an increasingly paraconsistent system,” he asks rhetorically, “in which, in a variety of modes, P is non-P: the order is its own transgression, capitalism can thrive under communist rule, and so on?”

Living in the End Times is presented by Žižek as being concerned with this situation. Summarizing the book’s central theme, he writes:

The underlying premise of the present book is a simple one: the global capitalist system is approaching an apocalyptic zero-point. Its “four riders of the apocalypse” are comprised by the ecological crisis, the consequences of the biogenetic revolution, imbalances within the system itself (problems with intellectual property; forthcoming struggles over raw materials, food and water), and the explosive growth of social divisions and exclusions.

With its sweeping claims and magniloquent rhetoric, this passage is typical of much in Žižek’s work. What he describes as the premise of the book is simple only because it passes over historical facts. Reading it, no one would suspect that, putting aside the killings of many millions for ideological reasons, some of the last century’s worst ecological disasters—the destruction of nature in the former Soviet Union and the devastation of the countryside during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, for example—occurred in centrally planned economies. Ecological devastation is not a result only of the economic system that exists in much of the world at the present time; while it may be true that the prevailing version of capitalism is unsustainable in environmental terms, there is nothing in the history of the past century that suggests the environment will be better protected if a socialist system is installed.

But to criticize Žižek for neglecting these facts is to misunderstand his intent, for unlike Marx he does not aim to ground his theorizing in a reading of history that is based in facts. “Today’s historical juncture does not compel us to drop the notion of the proletariat, or of the proletarian position—on the contrary, it compels us to radicalize it to an existential level beyond even Marx’s imagination,” he writes. “We need a more radical notion of the proletarian subject [i.e., the thinking and acting human being], a subject reduced to the evanescent point of the Cartesian cogito, deprived of its substantial content.” In Žižek’s hands, Marxian ideas—which in Marx’s materialist view were meant to designate objective social facts—become subjective expressions of revolutionary commitment. Whether such ideas correspond to anything in the world is irrelevant.

There is a problem at this point, however: Why should anyone adopt Žižek’s ideas rather than any others? The answer cannot be that Žižek’s are true in any traditional sense. “The truth we are dealing with here is not ‘objective’ truth,” Žižek writes, “but the self-relating truth about one’s own subjective position; as such, it is an engaged truth, measured not by its factual accuracy but by the way it affects the subjective position of enunciation.”

If this means anything, it is that truth is determined by reference to how an idea accords with the projects to which the speaker is committed—in Žižek’s case, a project of revolution. But this only poses the problem at another level: Why should anyone adopt Žižek’s project? The question cannot be answered in any simple way, since it is far from clear what Žižek’s revolutionary project consists in. He shows no signs of doubting that a society in which communism was realized would be better than any that has ever existed. On the other hand, he is unable to envision any circumstances in which communism might be realized: “Capitalism is not just a historical epoch among others…. Francis Fukuyama was right: global capitalism is ‘the end of history.’”1 Communism is not for Žižek—as it was for Marx—a realizable condition, but what Badiou describes as a “hypothesis,” a conception with little positive content but that enables radical resistance against prevailing institutions. Žižek is insistent that such resistance must include the use of terror:

Badiou’s provocative idea that one should reinvent emancipatory terror today is one of his most profound insights…. Recall Badiou’s exalted defense of Terror in the French Revolution, in which he quotes the justification of the guillotine for Lavoisier: “The Republic has no need for scientists.”2

Along with Badiou, Žižek celebrates Mao’s Cultural Revolution as “the last truly great revolutionary explosion of the twentieth century.” But he also regards the Cultural Revolution as a failure, citing Badiou’s conclusion that “the Cultural Revolution, even in its very impasse, bears witness to the impossibility truly and globally to free politics from the framework of the party-State.”3 Mao in encouraging the Cultural Revolution evidently should have found a way to break the power of the party-state. Again, Žižek praises the Khmer Rouge for attempting a total break with the past. The attempt involved mass killing and torture on a colossal scale; but in his view that is not why it failed: “The Khmer Rouge were, in a way, not radical enough: while they took the abstract negation of the past to the limit, they did not invent any new form of collectivity.” (Here and elsewhere the italics are Žižek’s.) A genuine revolution may be impossible in present circumstances, or any that can be currently imagined. Even so, revolutionary violence should be celebrated as “redemptive,” even “divine.”

While Žižek has described himself as a Leninist,4 there can be no doubt that this position would be anathema to the Bolshevik leader. Lenin had no qualms in using terror in order to promote the cause of communism (for him, a practically attainable objective). Always deployed as part of a political strategy, violence was instrumental in nature. In contrast, though Žižek accepts that violence has failed to achieve its communist goals and has no prospect of doing so, he insists that revolutionary violence has intrinsic value as a symbolic expression of rebellion—a position that has no parallel in either Marx or Lenin. A precedent may be seen in the work of the French psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, who defended the use of violence against colonialism as an assertion of the identity of subjects of colonial power; but Fanon viewed this violence as part of a struggle for national independence, an objective that was in fact achieved.

A clearer precedent can be found in the work of the early-twentieth-century French theorist of syndicalism Georges Sorel. In Reflections on Violence (1908), Sorel argued that communism was a utopian myth—but a myth that had value in inspiring a morally regenerative revolt against the corruption of bourgeois society. The parallels between this view and Žižek’s account of “redemptive violence” inspired by the “communist hypothesis” are telling.

A celebration of violence is one of the most prominent strands in Žižek’s work. He finds fault with Marx for thinking that violence can be justified as part of the conflict between objectively defined social classes. Class war must not be understood as “a conflict between particular agents within social reality: it is not a difference between agents (which can be described by means of a detailed social analysis), but an antagonism (‘struggle’) which constitutes these agents.” Applying this view when discussing Stalin’s assault on the peasantry, Žižek describes how the distinction between kulaks (rich peasants) and others became “blurred and unworkable: in a situation of generalized poverty, clear criteria no longer applied, and the other two classes of peasants often joined the kulaks in their resistance to forced collectivization.” In response to this situation the Soviet authorities introduced a new category, the sub-kulak, a peasant too poor to be classified as a kulak but who shared kulak values:

The art of identifying a kulak was thus no longer a matter of objective social analysis; it became a kind of complex “hermeneutics of suspicion,” of identifying an individual’s “true political attitudes” hidden beneath his or her deceptive public proclamations.

Describing mass murder in this way as an exercise in hermeneutics is repugnant and grotesque; it is also characteristic of Žižek’s work. He criticizes Stalin’s policy of collectivization, but not on account of the millions of human lives that were violently truncated or broken in its course. What Žižek criticizes is Stalin’s lingering attachment (however inconsistent or hypocritical) to “‘scientific’ Marxist terms.” Relying on “objective social analysis” for guidance in revolutionary situations is an error: “at some point, the process has to be cut short with a massive and brutal intervention of subjectivity: class belonging is never a purely objective social fact, but is always also the result of struggle and social engagement.” Rather than Stalin’s relentless use of torture and lethal force, it is the fact that he tried to justify the systematic use of violence by reference to Marxian theory that Žižek condemns.

Žižek’s rejection of anything that might be described as social fact comes together with his admiration of violence in his interpretation of Nazism. Commenting on the German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s much-discussed involvement with the Nazi regime, Žižek writes: “His involvement with the Nazis was not a simple mistake, but rather a ‘right step in the wrong direction.’” Contrary to many interpretations, Heidegger was not a radical reactionary. “Reading Heidegger against the grain, one discovers a thinker who was, at some points, strangely close to communism”—indeed, during the mid-Thirties, Heidegger might be described as “a future communist.”

If Heidegger mistakenly chose to back Hitler, the mistake was not in underestimating the violence that Hitler would unleash:

The problem with Hitler was that he was “not violent enough,” his violence was not “essential” enough. Hitler did not really act, all his actions were fundamentally reactions, for he acted so that nothing would really change, staging a gigantic spectacle of pseudo-Revolution so that the capitalist order would survive…. The true problem of Nazism is not that it “went too far” in its subjectivist-nihilist hubris of exercising total power, but that it did not go far enough, that its violence was an impotent acting-out which, ultimately, remained in the service of the very order it despised.

What was wrong with Nazism, it seems, is that—like the later experiment in total revolution of the Khmer Rouge—it failed to create any new kind of collective life. Žižek says little regarding the nature of the form of life that might have come into being had Germany been governed by a regime less reactive and powerless than he judges Hitler’s to have been. He does make plain that there would be no room in this new life for one particular form of human identity:

The fantasmatic status of anti- Semitism is clearly revealed by a statement attributed to Hitler: “We have to kill the Jew within us.” …Hitler’s statement says more than it wants to say: against his intentions, it confirms that the Gentiles need the anti-Semitic figure of the “Jew” in order to maintain their identity. It is thus not only that “the Jew is within us”—what Hitler fatefully forgot to add is that he, the anti-Semite, is also in the Jew. What does this paradoxical entwinement mean for the destiny of anti-Semitism?

Žižek is explicit in censuring “certain elements of the radical Left” for “their uneasiness when it comes to unambiguously condemning anti-Semitism.” But it is difficult to understand the claim that the identities of anti-Semites and Jewish people are in some way mutually reinforcing—which is repeated, word for word, in Less Than Nothing—except as suggesting that the only world in which anti-Semitism can cease to exist is one in which there are no longer any Jews.

Interpreting Žižek on this or any issue is not without difficulties. There is his inordinate prolixity, the stream of texts that no one could read in their entirety, if only because the torrent never ceases flowing. There is his use of a type of academic jargon featuring allusive references to other thinkers, which has the effect of enabling him to use language in an artful, hermetic way. As he acknowledges, Žižek borrows the term “divine violence” from Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” (1921). It is doubtful whether Benjamin—a thinker who had important affinities with the Frankfurt School of humanistic Marxism—would have described the destructive frenzy of Mao’s Cultural Revolution or the Khmer Rouge as divine.

But this is beside the point, for by using Benjamin’s construction Žižek is able to praise violence and at the same time claim that he is speaking of violence in a special, recondite sense—a sense in which Gandhi can be described as being more violent than Hitler.5 And there is Žižek’s regular recourse to a laborious kind of clowning wordplay:

The…virtualization of capitalism is ultimately the same as that of the electron in particle physics. The mass of each elementary particle is composed of its mass at rest plus the surplus provided by the acceleration of its movement; however, an electron’s mass at rest is zero, its mass consists only of the surplus generated by the acceleration, as if we are dealing with a nothing which acquires some deceptive substance only by magically spinning itself into an excess of itself.

It is impossible to read this without recalling the Sokal affair in which Alan Sokal, a professor of physics, submitted a spoof article, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” to a journal of postmodern cultural studies. Equally, it is hard to read this and many similar passages in Žižek without suspecting that he is engaged—wittingly or otherwise—in a kind of auto-parody.

There may be some who are tempted to condemn Žižek as a philosopher of irrationalism whose praise of violence is more reminiscent of the far right than the radical left. His writings are often offensive and at times (as when he writes of Hitler being present “in the Jew”) obscene. There is a mocking frivolity in Žižek’s paeans to terror that recalls the Italian Futurist and ultra-nationalist Gabriele D’Annunzio and the Fascist (and later Maoist) fellow traveler Curzio Malaparte more than any thinker in the Marxian tradition. But there is another reading of Žižek, which may be more plausible, in which he is no more an epigone of the right than he is a disciple of Marx or Lenin.

Whether or not Marx’s vision of communism is “the inherent capitalist fantasy,” Žižek’s vision—which apart from rejecting earlier conceptions lacks any definite content—is well adapted to an economy based on the continuous production of novel commodities and experiences, each supposed to be different from any that has gone before. With the prevailing capitalist order aware that it is in trouble but unable to conceive of practicable alternatives, Žižek’s formless radicalism is ideally suited to a culture transfixed by the spectacle of its own fragility. That there should be this isomorphism between Žižek’s thinking and contemporary capitalism is not surprising. After all, it is only an economy of the kind that exists today that could produce a thinker such as Žižek. The role of global public intellectual Žižek performs has emerged along with a media apparatus and a culture of celebrity that are integral to the current model of capitalist expansion.

In a stupendous feat of intellectual overproduction Žižek has created a fantasmatic critique of the present order, a critique that claims to repudiate practically everything that currently exists and in some sense actually does, but that at the same time reproduces the compulsive, purposeless dynamism that he perceives in the operations of capitalism. Achieving a deceptive substance by endlessly reiterating an essentially empty vision, Žižek’s work—nicely illustrating the principles of paraconsistent logic—amounts in the end to less than nothing.

1 Slavoj Žižek, “Have Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Rewritten the Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century?,” Rethinking Marxism: a Journal of Economics, Culture and Society , Vol. 13, No. 3–4 (2001), p. 190. ↩

2 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View ( MIT Press, 2006), p. 326. ↩

3 Žižek, The Parallax View , p. 328. ↩

4 “ I am a Leninist. Lenin wasn’t afraid to dirty his hands. If you can get power, grab it .” Quoted by Jonathan Derbyshire, New Statesman , October 29, 2009. ↩

5 “It’s crucial to see violence which is done repeatedly to keep the things the way they are. In that sense, Gandhi was more violent than Hitler.” See Shobhan Saxena’s interview with Žižek, “ First they called me a joker, now I am a dangerous thinker ,” The Times of India , January 10, 2010. ↩


    05 Millions of working families one push from penury, Guardian research finds

    The Guardian home

    Millions of working families one push from penury, Guardian research finds

    Findings that 2.2m children live in households on economic cliff-edge challenge coalition claim people are better off in work

    Accrington in Lancashire, where 30% of households are at risk of slipping into 'official poverty'.

    Accrington in the Lancashire borough of Hyndburn, where 30% of households are at risk of slipping into ‘official poverty’. Photograph: Bruce Adams/Daily Mail/Rex

    Almost 7 million working-age adults are living in extreme financial stress, one small push from penury, despite being in employment and largely independent of state support, according to the most comprehensive study yet of the finances of employed households, commissioned by the Guardian.

    Unlike the “squeezed middle”, these 3.6m British households have little or no savings, nor equity in their homes, and struggle at the end of each month to feed themselves and their children adequately. They say they are unable to cope on their current incomes and have no assets to fall back on, leaving them vulnerable to something as simple as an unexpectedly large fuel bill.

    The findings challenge the argument made by the work and pensions secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, who said last week that parents should get a job to ensure their children are not brought up in poverty.

    “These figures are a mega-indictment on the mantra of both political parties, that work is the route out of poverty,” said Frank Field, Labour MP for Birkenhead and former welfare minister who is now the coalition’s poverty tsar. “What’s shocking about this is that these are people who want to work and are working but who, despite putting their faith in the politicians’ mantra, find themselves in another cul-de-sac. Recent welfare cuts and policy changes make it difficult to advise these people where they should turn to get out of it: it really is genuinely shocking.”

    This group are “traditionally proud, self-reliant, working people”, said Bruno Rost, head of Experian Public Sector, who used more than 400 variables from Experian’s database and government research to identify those belonging to At-Risk Britain. After removing from the research households in the “most deprived” categories, Rost’s team focused on those working but are nevertheless suffering high levels of financial stress.

    He also looked at respondents’ attitudes, behaviour and outlook.

    “These are the new working class – except the work they do no longer pays,” Rost added. “These people say that being forced to claim benefits or move into a council property would be the worst kind of social ignominy and self-failure.”

    Challenging the government’s claim that people are better off in work than on benefits, the exclusive research found that 2.2 million children live in families teetering on an economic cliff-edge – despite one or both adults earning a low to middle income. The households in trouble include couples without children who earn a gross annual income of between £12,000 and £29,000, or couples with two children on between £17,000 and £41,000.

    Revealing thathaving a job is no protection against homelessness and destitution in modern-day Britain, the findings challenge David Cameron‘s claim to be committed to “a fair society in which effort is rewarded [and] work pays“.

    The findings echo a report by Oxfam last week that more people in poverty were working than unemployed and the number in work but claiming housing benefit had more than doubled since 2005, to nearly 900,000. People in work were increasingly turning to charities for help, Oxfam said, with thousands more accessing food banks this year than last.

    The findings come on the first day of an exclusive series by the Guardian on the reality of poverty in austerity Britain.

    The research into 26m households across the UK, carried out by Experian, identified eight types of employed adults most likely to be suffering in-work poverty, including:

    • Self-employed tradespeople living in small communities.

    • Ethnically mixed communities and single people who are living in the centre of small towns.

    • Young owners and private renters in inner-city terraces.

    The findings redraw the perceived map of acute financial stress, finding it is not an exclusively northern or inner-city problem. Working households across large parts of south-west England, outer London and East Anglia struggle to avoid slipping into official poverty.

    Top of the “at-risk” list are the “English Riviera” towns of Torquay, Paignton and Brixham.

    The groups experiencing poverty vary from region to region. In Torbay, the most “at risk” are indebted families living in low-rise estates; mixed communities with many single people in the centre of the small town, and self-employed tradespeople.

    By contrast, the Lancashire borough of Hyndburn – which includes Accrington and is second in the list with 30% of households at risk – has a higher number of south Asian communities experiencing social deprivation and low-income families occupying poor-quality, older terrace houses.

    In Brent, north London – Britain’s most mixed borough – it is predominantly upwardly mobile South Asian families living in interwar suburbs who suffer.

    The local government districts of Fenland in Cambridgeshire and South Holland in the East Midlands also have just under a third of households at risk of poverty.

    Further research, also commissioned by the Guardian, reveals average salaries by region and how this has changed over the past five years. People working in the Blackpool South parliamentary constituency have the lowest average wages in the UK – £320 a week, compared with £1,305 a week in the London borough of Kensington, according to a deprivation index commissioned from the Resolution Foundation, an independent thinktank aiming to help those on low to middle incomes. The four constituencies with the lowest average wage are in north-west England; those working in Blackley and Broughton, Preston and Middlesbrough earn an average salary of between £323 to £330 per week.

    Gavin Kelly, chief executive of the Resolution Foundation, said: “Many households move in and out of the low to middle income group from one year to the next, but around a third remain ‘stuck’ over the longer term, finding themselves in the group over a 15-year period.” He warned that the stagnating economy, increasing unemployment, rising prices, falling incomes and cuts to public services – 88% of which lie ahead over the next four years – meant things would get worse for those on low incomes.

    Last night a spokesman for the Department for Work and Pensions said: “For years the welfare state has not helped those people who are in work but on low incomes. The whole point of Universal Credit is that it will help make work pay and help those on lower incomes, topping up wages, ensuring it is financially better to always be in work than on benefits.

    “What is clear and this research shows, is that the existing system doesn’t help those families who strive to do the right thing.”

    June 18, 2012

    05 Un político hechizado por el poder

    Filed under: economía,Holístico,módulo básico,política — fores @ 4:58 am

    Un político hechizado por el poder

    La corrupción condena al ostracismo a Rafael Blasco tanto con el PP como con el PSPV

    12 JUN 2012 – 22:33 CET18
    © by sciammarella

    Si algo define a Rafael Blasco (Alzira, 1945) es la pulsión por el poder. Una obsesión que ha convertido en 40 años de carrera política, interrumpidos únicamente por los casos de corrupción. Más de cuatro décadas en las que ha recorrido casi todo el espectro ideológico —desde la extrema izquierda hasta la derecha liberal— para acabar derribado por uno de los escándalos políticos más difíciles de digerir por la opinión pública, el saqueo de las ayudas destinadas a la cooperación.

    La vida política de Blasco arranca en los años sesenta en la clandestinidad. Bajo el influjo del marxismo-leninismo, Blasco ingresa en el Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico (FRAP). “Al final del franquismo hace su primer ejercicio de pragmatismo y, tras tantear la viabilidad de un partido republicano, ingresa en el PSOE de la mano de su hermano Paco, que durante años será alcalde Alzira”, explica uno de sus antiguos camaradas.

    En la transición, los Blasco levantan el PSOE en la comarca de La Ribera y, cuando en 1983 Joan Lerma se convierte en el primer presidente de la Generalitat, Rafael es nombrado consejero de Presidencia. Son años de vino y rosas y Blasco contrae matrimonio con Consuelo Ciscar, secretaria personal de Lerma y hermana de Ciprià, titular de Educación.

    La ambición, esa pulsión que hace que piense en política 24 horas al día, lleva a Blasco a cuestionar el liderazgo de Lerma, que lo aparta a la Consejería de de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo en 1985. Son años de tiranteces, pero todo salta por los aires en 1989, cuando Blanca Blanquer, responsable de Urbanismo, presenta una denuncia por sobornos a funcionarios a cambio de la recalificación de terrenos.

    Lerma no duda. Destituye a Blasco y lo pone en cuarentena en el partido. La invalidación de unas grabaciones, presuntamente incriminatorias, permite a Blasco salir absuelto, pero ya no regresará al socialismo. De esos años, le viene al político alzireño la costumbre de usar teléfonos públicos, en vez de particulares.

    El político alzireño ha buscado siempre estar lo más dentro posible del Gobierno

    El periodo entre 1991 y 1994 se convierte en el cuatrienio del destierro y regresa a su plaza de interventor municipal. Aunque no se detiene. Crea el Partido Socialista Independiente (PSI), promueve un fracasado proyecto de Convergència Valenciana y, finalmente, se aproxima al PP a través de Eduardo Zaplana. La victoria del PP en 1995 le abre de nuevo la puerta de Presidencia. Allí, como subsecretario de Planificación, asume parte de la fontanería, contribuye a fagocitar Unión Valenciana y crea redes clientelares de consumidores. En 1999, Zaplana lo premia y lo nombra consejero de Empleo (1999-2000) y de Bienestar Social (2000-2003). No sabe que Blasco será uno de los primeros en traicionarlo y ponerse al servicio de Francisco Camps. El nuevo presidente lo recompensa, pese a su pasado, y lo nombra consejero de Territorio y Vivienda (2003-2006, años de urbanismo salvaje y de los primeros contratos con Gürtel) y de Sanidad (2006-2007).

    Camps, reelegido en 2007 ya sin lastres, decide orillar a Blasco y le otorga una cartera menor, la de Inmigración, casi sin presupuesto. Sin embargo, el estallido del caso Gürtel y la parálisis del Ejecutivo llevan a Camps a pedir a Blasco en 2010 que diseñe una estrategia política frente a los escándalos. Una oportunidad que Blasco aprovecha para ampliar sus poderes: logra más competencias en la rebautizada Consejería de Solidaridad y el nombramiento de portavoz parlamentario.

    Con el poder renovado, Blasco intenta abarcarlo todo. Aparece en grabaciones sobre el futuro del Valencia CF, se entrevista con promotores… Pero mientras despliega su red, el sistema corrupto del área de Cooperación se resquebraja. Se filtran docenas de documentos llenos de irregularidades que acaban en el juzgado y en los periódicos. Es el principio de su segunda debacle.

    Camps gana los comicios de 2011, pero no puede mantener a Blasco en el Consell ante las presiones de Génova y parte del PP valenciano. Pese a ello, el jefe del Consell cambia la ley de Gobierno antes de dimitir para permitir que su estratega, al que mantiene de portavoz parlamentario, pueda acudir a las reuniones del Consell con voz pero sin voto.

    La llegada de Fabra en julio pasado y el avance del sumario judicial no hacen sino debilitar paulatinamente a Blasco. Primero el jefe del Consell cierra el grifo del dinero a los proyectos diseñados por Blasco, poco después le explican que no es bienvenido a las reuniones de Gobierno y, finalmente, Fabra destituye a los cargos de confianza del portavoz del PP en la Generalitat. El martes, el presidente lo apartó de la portavocía.

    Puede que, en ese momento, Blasco se acordase de Camps cuando decía: “Quedan uno o dos escaloncitos y toda esta cuestión tan estrafalaria será cosa del pasado”.

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