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May 5, 2009

00 VanGogh’s ear ‘cut off’ by Gauguin

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 10:40 am

Art historians claim Van Gogh’s ear ‘cut off by Gauguin’

Angelique Chrisafis in Paris
* guardian.co.uk, Monday 4 May 2009 21.55 BST

‘Self-portrait with cut ear’ by Vincent Van Gogh. Photograph: Roger-Viollet/Rex Features

Vincent van Gogh’s fame may owe as much to a legendary act of self-harm, as it does to his self-portraits. But, 119 years after his death, the tortured post-Impressionist’s bloody ear is at the centre of a new controversy, after two historians suggested that the painter did not hack off his own lobe but was attacked by his friend, the French artist Paul Gauguin.

According to official versions, the disturbed Dutch painter cut off his ear with a razor after a row with Gauguin in 1888. Bleeding heavily, Van Gogh then walked to a brothel and presented the severed ear to an astonished prostitute called Rachel before going home to sleep in a blood-drenched bed.

But two German art historians, who have spent 10 years reviewing the police investigations, witness accounts and the artists’ letters, argue that Gauguin, a fencing ace, most likely sliced off the ear with his sword during a fight, and the two artists agreed to hush up the truth.

In Van Gogh’s Ear: Paul Gauguin and the Pact of Silence, published in Germany, Hamburg-based academics Hans Kaufmann and Rita Wildegans argue that the official version of events, based largely on Gauguin’s accounts, contain inconsistencies and that both artists hinted that the truth was more complex.

Van Gogh and Gauguin’s troubled friendship was legendary. In 1888, Van Gogh persuaded him to come to Arles in the south of France to live with him in the Yellow House he had set up as a “studio of the south”. They spent the autumn painting together before things soured. Just before Christmas, they fell out. Van Gogh, seized by an attack of a metabolic disease became aggressive and was apparently crushed when Gauguin said he was leaving for good.

Kaufmann told the Guardian: “Near the brothel, about 300 metres from the Yellow House, there was a final encounter between them: Vincent might have attacked him, Gauguin wanted to defend himself and to get rid of this ‘madman’. He drew his weapon, made some movement in the direction of Vincent and by that cut off his left ear.” Kaufmann said it was not clear if it was an accident or an aimed hit.

While curators at the Van Gogh museum in Amsterdam stand by the theory of self-mutilation, Kaufmann argues that Van Gogh dropped hints in letters to his brother, Theo, once commenting : “Luckily Gauguin … is not yet armed with machine guns and other dangerous war weapons.”

April 28, 2009

00 The Bard’s Beautiful Mind

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 12:20 pm

The Bard’s Beautiful Mind

 

  Enlarge Photo    
 

By Louis Bayard
Special to The Washington Post
Tuesday, April 28, 2009

 

 

SOUL OF THE AGE

A Biography of the Mind of William Shakespeare

By Jonathan Bate

Random House. 471 pp. $35

“Soul of the age” is Ben Jonson’s coinage, but “A Biography of the Mind of William Shakespeare”? That’s the brazen agenda of British scholar Jonathan Bate, and them’s fighting words.

On one side of the quarrel: the school that squeezes the Bard’s work like tea leaves for every last drop of autobiography. Shakespeare’s wife becomes Kate the shrew; Shakespeare’s daughter becomes Rosalind; Shakespeare himself becomes Prospero. . . . Literalism holds court, and metaphor sulks into exile. If the sonneteer speaks of being “made lame by Fortune’s dearest spite,” get plates on the cart that ran him over.

On the other side stands the agnostic reduction of George Bernard Shaw: “Everything we know about Shakespeare can be got into a half-hour sketch. He was a very civil gentleman who got round men of all classes; he was extremely susceptible to word-music and to graces of speech; he picked up all sorts of odds and ends from books and from the street talk of his day and welded them into his work. . . . Add to this that he was, like all highly intelligent and conscientious people, business-like about money and appreciative of the value of respectability and the discomfort and discredit of Bohemianism; also that he stood on his social position and desired to have it affirmed by a grant of a coat of arms, and you have all we know of Shakespeare beyond what we gather from his plays.”

Let’s be grateful, at least, that Shaw gave us that final loophole, for it is exactly the opening through which Jonathan Bate wriggles, emerging with this beauty of a book, rich in insight, immaculate in scholarship, a work that is destined, like Stephen Greenblatt’s “Will in the World,” to become one of the standard sources on its subject.

Bate’s particular tack is to come at Shakespeare’s life through the seven ages of man, as enumerated by the cynic Jaques in “As You Like It.” At first blush, this seems counterproductive. Shakespeare was, obviously, an infant and a schoolboy and a lover, too (but of whom?). Nothing in the record, though, suggests he was a soldier or a justice; and, dying as he did at the age of 52, he didn’t enjoy much of a breather between “the lean and slippered pantaloon” (not a pair of trousers but an old stock character from the commedia dell’arte) and that final act, “second childishness and mere oblivion.”

In fact, Jaques’s speech is just the scaffolding for a dazzling exploration of Shakespeare’s “world picture.” In one chapter, Bate analyzes the Christian-Islamic geopolitics that informed the writing of “Othello.” In another, he combs the records of Stratford bawdy courts to see how they colored the trial of Queen Hermione in “The Winter’s Tale.” Everywhere, he samples the intellectual stew from which Shakespeare’s plays and poems bubbled up: Plutarch, Chaucer, Ovid’s “Metamorphoses” (source of 90 percent of Shakespeare’s mythological allusions), not to mention the Ciceronian orations that infuse Marc Antony’s rabble-rousing and the still-bracing essays of Montaigne, whose intellectual journey uncannily mirrors Hamlet’s. (Bate also speculates, deliciously, that Shakespeare may have read and enjoyed the first English translation of “Don Quixote.”)

Through it all, Bate stays squarely within the realm of known facts. Which is to say he tiptoes ’round the minefield of Shakespeare’s marriage, surely one of the least documented alliances in literary history, and recognizes at every turn the elusiveness of his subject’s religion, politics and sexual orientation. Rather than simply guess at the identity of the sonnets’ “fair youth” and “dark lady” and rival poet, for example, Bate raises the possibility that they may never have existed. But steering clear of “wild surmise” doesn’t stop Bate from making inferential leaps of his own: “Shakespeare is often praised for sympathizing equally with all his characters. But he did not. There are some characters with whom he fell in love. Falstaff and Cleopatra are preeminent among them.”

Bate’s erudition and engagement have at least two ancillary effects. First, they put paid to the notion that Shakespeare’s plays, with their rural nature scenes and their understanding of mid-English “types” like Justice Shallow, could have been written by anybody but a grammar-school boy from Warwickshire. Indeed, Bate suggests that Shakespeare’s provincial status as the son of a failed glover and grandson of a yeoman farmer “may go some way to explaining why he was so fascinated by outsiders such as Shylock the Jew and Othello the Moor in Venice.”

“Soul of the Age” also reminds us of the powerful role contingency plays in art’s survival. To cite one example, if John Hemings and Henry Condell, Shakespeare’s former colleagues, hadn’t troubled themselves to reconstruct and publish the Bard’s plays — the author himself never bothered — we would have lost nearly half his canon, including “Macbeth,” “Julius Caesar,” “As You Like It,” “Twelfth Night” and “The Taming of the Shrew.”

Or ponder this historical near-miss: On Feb. 8, 1601, the Earl of Essex mounted a rather half-hearted insurrection that may or may not have been directed against Queen Elizabeth. The uprising was soon quashed, but when authorities learned that Essex’s allies, the day before, had watched a Globe Theatre production of Shakespeare’s “Richard II” — a play that, in baldest terms, documents the overthrow of an English monarch — the man who commissioned the performance was executed. If the play’s author had met a similar fate (and it now seems slightly miraculous that he didn’t), he would not have lived to write “Hamlet.” Or “King Lear.” Or “Othello.” Or “Antony and Cleopatra.” Or “The Tempest.”

The longevity of Shakespeare’s work, then, has something to do with the longevity of Shakespeare. He was, in Bate’s words, “the great survivor . . . the one dramatist of his generation never to be imprisoned or censored in connection with his work . . . the one dramatist who eventually ended his career out of choice, not by force of circumstance.” By purchasing shares in his own theater companies, Shakespeare earned enough money to buy his wife the second-largest house in Stratford and to end his days in comfort.

A serene bourgeois existence, we might call it, and here contingency gives way to mystery, for how many serene bourgeois wrote like this? As Bate reminds us, the seven ages of man were already a commonplace trope by Elizabeth’s time, but in earlier iterations, the infant merely cries. “Only in Shakespeare’s does it do anything so theatrical as puke — indeed, no writer had ever used the word puke as a verb before. There is a specificity to the schoolboy, with his satchel and ‘shining morning face,’ that is lacking in the generic children of previous versions. . . . Uniquely too in Shakespeare, who made his living from his actors’ powers of articulation, each age is a voice: the infant mewling, the schoolboy whining, the lover sighing, the soldier swearing, the justice preaching, the old man piping and whistling, his voice turning again toward childish treble. And only at the last oblivion comes the rest that is silence.”

Bayard is a novelist and reviewer whose most recent book is “The Black Tower.”

 

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/27/AR2009042703479.html

00 Cyberspace Warfare

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 11:18 am

U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Cyberspace Warfare

By DAVID E. SANGER, JOHN MARKOFF and THOM SHANKER
Published: April 27, 2009

This article was reported by David E. Sanger, John Markoff and Thom Shanker and written by Mr. Sanger.
Mario Jose Sanchez/Associated Press
Melissa Hathaway, the White House cybersecurity coordinator, speaking last week in San Francisco.

Cyberwar
The Digital Arms Race

Computers, indispensable in peace, are becoming ever more important in political conflicts and open warfare. This is the first article in a series on the growing use of computing power as a weapon.

When American forces in Iraq wanted to lure members of Al Qaeda into a trap, they hacked into one of the group’s computers and altered information that drove them into American gun sights.

When President George W. Bush ordered new ways to slow Iran’s progress toward a nuclear bomb last year, he approved a plan for an experimental covert program — its results still unclear — to bore into their computers and undermine the project.

And the Pentagon has commissioned military contractors to develop a highly classified replica of the Internet of the future. The goal is to simulate what it would take for adversaries to shut down the country’s power stations, telecommunications and aviation systems, or freeze the financial markets — in an effort to build better defenses against such attacks, as well as a new generation of online weapons.

Just as the invention of the atomic bomb changed warfare and deterrence 64 years ago, a new international race has begun to develop cyberweapons and systems to protect against them.

Thousands of daily attacks on federal and private computer systems in the United States — many from China and Russia, some malicious and some testing chinks in the patchwork of American firewalls — have prompted the Obama administration to review American strategy.

President Obama is expected to propose a far larger defensive effort in coming days, including an expansion of the $17 billion, five-year program that Congress approved last year, the appointment of a White House official to coordinate the effort, and an end to a running bureaucratic battle over who is responsible for defending against cyberattacks.

But Mr. Obama is expected to say little or nothing about the nation’s offensive capabilities, on which the military and the nation’s intelligence agencies have been spending billions. In interviews over the past several months, a range of military and intelligence officials, as well as outside experts, have described a huge increase in the sophistication of American cyberwarfare capabilities.

Because so many aspects of the American effort to develop cyberweapons and define their proper use remain classified, many of those officials declined to speak on the record. The White House declined several requests for interviews or to say whether Mr. Obama as a matter of policy supports or opposes the use of American cyberweapons.

The most exotic innovations under consideration would enable a Pentagon programmer to surreptitiously enter a computer server in Russia or China, for example, and destroy a “botnet” — a potentially destructive program that commandeers infected machines into a vast network that can be clandestinely controlled — before it could be unleashed in the United States.

Or American intelligence agencies could activate malicious code that is secretly embedded on computer chips when they are manufactured, enabling the United States to take command of an enemy’s computers by remote control over the Internet. That, of course, is exactly the kind of attack officials fear could be launched on American targets, often through Chinese-made chips or computer servers.

So far, however, there are no broad authorizations for American forces to engage in cyberwar. The invasion of the Qaeda computer in Iraq several years ago and the covert activity in Iran were each individually authorized by Mr. Bush. When he issued a set of classified presidential orders in January 2008 to organize and improve America’s online defenses, the administration could not agree on how to write the authorization.

A principal architect of that order said the issue had been passed on to the next president, in part because of the complexities of cyberwar operations that, by necessity, would most likely be conducted on both domestic and foreign Internet sites. After the controversy surrounding domestic spying, Mr. Bush’s aides concluded, the Bush White House did not have the credibility or the political capital to deal with the subject.

Electronic Vulnerabilities

Cyberwar would not be as lethal as atomic war, of course, nor as visibly dramatic. But when Mike McConnell, the former director of national intelligence, briefed Mr. Bush on the threat in May 2007, he argued that if a single large American bank were successfully attacked “it would have an order-of-magnitude greater impact on the global economy” than the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Mr. McConnell, who left office three months ago, warned last year that “the ability to threaten the U.S. money supply is the equivalent of today’s nuclear weapon.”

The scenarios developed last year for the incoming president by Mr. McConnell and his coordinator for cybersecurity, Melissa Hathaway, went further. They described vulnerabilities including an attack on Wall Street and one intended to bring down the nation’s electric power grid. Most were extrapolations of attacks already tried.

Today, Ms. Hathaway is the primary author of White House cyberstrategy and has been traveling the country talking in vague terms about recent, increasingly bold attacks on the computer networks that keep the country running. Government officials will not discuss the details of a recent attack on the air transportation network, other than to say the attack never directly affected air traffic control systems.

Still, the specter of an attack that could blind air traffic controllers and, perhaps, the military’s aerospace defense networks haunts military and intelligence officials. (The saving grace of the air traffic control system, officials say, is that it is so old that it is not directly connected to the Internet.)

Studies, with code names like Dark Angel, have focused on whether cellphone towers, emergency-service communications and hospital systems could be brought down, to sow chaos.

But the theoretical has, at times, become real.

“We have seen Chinese network operations inside certain of our electricity grids,” said Joel F. Brenner, who oversees counterintelligence operations for Dennis Blair, Mr. McConnell’s successor as national intelligence director, speaking at the University of Texas at Austin this month. “Do I worry about those grids, and about air traffic control systems, water supply systems, and so on? You bet I do.”

But the broader question — one the administration so far declines to discuss — is whether the best defense against cyberattack is the development of a robust capability to wage cyberwar.

As Mr. Obama’s team quickly discovered, the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies both concluded in Mr. Bush’s last years in office that it would not be enough to simply build higher firewalls and better virus detectors or to restrict access to the federal government’s own computers.

“The fortress model simply will not work for cyber,” said one senior military officer who has been deeply engaged in the debate for several years. “Someone will always get in.”

That thinking has led to a debate over whether lessons learned in the nuclear age — from the days of “mutually assured destruction” — apply to cyberwar.

But in cyberwar, it is hard to know where to strike back, or even who the attacker might be. Others have argued for borrowing a page from Mr. Bush’s pre-emption doctrine by going into foreign computers to destroy malicious software before it is unleashed into the world’s digital bloodstream. But that could amount to an act of war, and many argue it is a losing game, because the United States is more dependent on a constantly running Internet system than many of its potential adversaries, and therefore could suffer more damage in a counterattack.

In a report scheduled to be released Wednesday, the National Research Council will argue that although an offensive cybercapability is an important asset for the United States, the nation is lacking a clear strategy, and secrecy surrounding preparations has hindered national debate, according to several people familiar with the report.

The advent of Internet attacks — especially those suspected of being directed by nations, not hackers — has given rise to a new term inside the Pentagon and the National Security Agency: “hybrid warfare.”

It describes a conflict in which attacks through the Internet can be launched as a warning shot — or to pave the way for a traditional attack.

Early hints of this new kind of warfare emerged in the confrontation between Russia and Estonia in April 2007. Clandestine groups — it was never determined if they had links to the Russian government — commandeered computers around the globe and directed a fire hose of data at Estonia’s banking system and its government Web sites.

The computer screens of Estonians trying to do business with the government online were frozen, if they got anything at all. It was annoying, but by the standards of cyberwar, it was child’s play.

In August 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia, the cyberattacks grew more widespread. Georgians were denied online access to news, cash and air tickets. The Georgian government had to move its Internet activity to servers in Ukraine when its own servers locked up, but the attacks did no permanent damage.

Every few months, it seems, some agency, research group or military contractor runs a war game to assess the United States’ vulnerability. Senior intelligence officials were shocked to discover how easy it was to permanently disable a large power generator. That prompted further studies to determine if attackers could take down a series of generators, bringing whole parts of the country to a halt.

Another war game that the Department of Homeland Security sponsored in March 2008, called Cyber Storm II, envisioned a far larger, coordinated attack against the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It studied a disruption of chemical plants, rail lines, oil and gas pipelines and private computer networks. That study and others like it concluded that when attacks go global, the potential economic repercussions increase exponentially.

To prove the point, Mr. McConnell, then the director of national intelligence, spent much of last summer urging senior government officials to examine the Treasury Department’s scramble to contain the effects of the collapse of Bear Stearns. Markets froze, he said, because “what backs up that money is confidence — an accounting system that is reconcilable.” He began studies of what would happen if the system that clears market trades froze.

“We were halfway through the study,” one senior intelligence official said last month, “and the markets froze of their own accord. And we looked at each other and said, ‘Our market collapse has just given every cyberwarrior out there a playbook.’ ”

Just before Mr. Obama was elected, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a policy research group in Washington, warned in a report that “America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the new administration.”

What alarmed the panel was not the capabilities of individual hackers but of nations — China and Russia among them — that experts believe are putting huge resources into the development of cyberweapons. A research company called Team Cymru recently examined “scans” that came across the Internet seeking ways to get inside industrial control systems, and discovered more than 90 percent of them came from computers in China.

Scanning alone does no damage, but it could be the prelude to an attack that scrambles databases or seeks to control computers. But Team Cymru ran into a brick wall as soon as it tried to trace who, exactly, was probing these industrial systems. It could not determine whether military organizations, intelligence agencies, terrorist groups, criminals or inventive teenagers were behind the efforts.

The good news, some government officials argue, is that the Chinese are deterred from doing real damage: Because they hold more than a trillion dollars in United States government debt, they have little interest in freezing up a system they depend on for their own investments.

Then again, some of the scans seemed to originate from 14 other countries, including Taiwan, Russia and, of course, the United States.

Bikini Atoll for an Online Age

Because “cyberwar” contains the word “war,” the Pentagon has argued that it should be the locus of American defensive and offensive strategy — and it is creating the kind of infrastructure that was built around nuclear weapons in the 1940s and ’50s.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is considering proposals to create a Cyber Command — initially as a new headquarters within the Strategic Command, which controls the American nuclear arsenal and assets in space. Right now, the responsibility for computer network security is part of Strategic Command, and military officials there estimate that over the past six months, the government has spent $100 million responding to probes and attacks on military systems. Air Force officials confirm that a large network of computers at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama was temporarily taken off-line within the past eight months when it was put at risk of widespread infection from computer viruses.

But Mr. Gates has concluded that the military’s cyberwarfare effort requires a sharper focus — and thus a specific command. It would build the defenses for military computers and communications systems and — the part the Pentagon is reluctant to discuss — develop and deploy cyberweapons.

In fact, that effort is already under way — it is part of what the National Cyber Range is all about. The range is a replica of the Internet of the future, and it is being built to be attacked. Competing teams of contractors — including BAE Systems, the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University and Sparta Inc. — are vying to build the Pentagon a system it can use to simulate attacks. The National Security Agency already has a smaller version of a similar system, in Millersville, Md.

In short, the Cyber Range is to the digital age what the Bikini Atoll — the islands the Army vaporized in the 1950s to measure the power of the hydrogen bomb — was to the nuclear age. But once the tests at Bikini Atoll demonstrated to the world the awesome destructive power of the bomb, it became evident to the United States and the Soviet Union — and other nuclear powers — that the risks of a nuclear exchange were simply too high. In the case of cyberattacks, where the results can vary from the annoying to the devastating, there are no such rules.

The Deterrence Conundrum

During the cold war, if a strategic missile had been fired at the United States, screens deep in a mountain in Colorado would have lighted up and American commanders would have some time to decide whether to launch a counterattack. Today, when Pentagon computers are subjected to a barrage, the origin is often a mystery. Absent certainty about the source, it is almost impossible to mount a counterattack.

In the rare case where the preparations for an attack are detected in a foreign computer system, there is continuing debate about whether to embrace the concept of pre-emption, with all of its Bush-era connotations. The questions range from whether an online attack should be mounted on that system to, in an extreme case, blowing those computers up.

Some officials argue that if the United States engaged in such pre-emption — and demonstrated that it was watching the development of hostile cyberweapons — it could begin to deter some attacks. Others believe it will only justify pre-emptive attacks on the United States. “Russia and China have lots of nationalistic hackers,” one senior military officer said. “They seem very, very willing to take action on their own.”

Senior Pentagon and military officials also express deep concern that the laws and understanding of armed conflict have not kept current with the challenges of offensive cyberwarfare.

Over the decades, a number of limits on action have been accepted — if not always practiced. One is the prohibition against assassinating government leaders. Another is avoiding attacks aimed at civilians. Yet in the cyberworld, where the most vulnerable targets are civilian, there are no such rules or understandings. If a military base is attacked, would it be a proportional, legitimate response to bring down the attacker’s power grid if that would also shut down its hospital systems, its air traffic control system or its banking system?

“We don’t have that for cyber yet,” one senior Defense Department official said, “and that’s a little bit dangerous.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html

April 22, 2009

00 Juan José Millás – Genio y Figura

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 2:58 pm

Levante-EMV.com » Opinión

Lo tienen crudo

Juan José Millás

ETA está más infiltrada que un queso de gruyer. Los jefes de la banda desconfían de los militantes y los militantes de los jefes. Jurdan Martitegui, el último mandamás detenido cuando acudía a una cita con alguien a quien iba a enseñar a preparar una tartera, tomó sin duda mil precauciones antes de llegar al lugar del encuentro (un cementerio, qué premonitorio) que no le sirvieron de nada porque seguramente el infiltrado, sin saberlo, era él. ¿Se puede ser un infiltrado sin saberlo? Perfectamente. Todas las organizaciones criminales caen por esta causa. Cuando en una banda no hay forma de distinguir a los partidarios de los no partidarios, caput, se acabó, mejor volver a casa, si la tienes, o solicitar el indulto. Hay una tercera posibilidad: la de desaparecer en la niebla si la niebla no te rechaza, que es muy suya.
No sabemos cuántos militantes tiene ETA en estos momentos, pero es posible que más de la mitad sean topos. El topo actúa al modo de la carcoma: cuando ves un agujero, el interior ya está repleto de galerías, o sea, podrido. El proceso resulta apasionante por su carga metafórica. El problema no es ya que un militante acérrimo (qué rayos querrá decir acérrimo) se convierta sin saberlo (como Jurdan Martitegui) en un confidente. El problema es cuando el confidente deja de tener conciencia de serlo. Entre los que proceden conscientemente de la confidencia y los que se dirigen inconscientemente a ella, se produce una ensalada ideológica muy parecida al Apocalipsis. ETA se encuentra en un Apocalipsis tal que ni siquiera sabe cómo rendirse, ni a quién. Entre tanto, Josu Ternera, del que no sabemos si va o viene, permanece a la espera, o a la escucha, ignoramos en qué lado de la raya (de cocaína).
Filtraciones e infiltraciones. He aquí los dos grandes asuntos de nuestra época. Si filtrar es hacer pasar un fluido por un filtro, infiltrar sería introducir suavemente un líquido entre los poros de un sólido. Lo que estamos haciendo con ETA es infiltrarla suavemente, de manera que el líquido llegue a formar parte del sólido hasta el punto de que no se pueda separar una cosa de otra ni centrifugándola. Así que cuando se detiene a alguien, el detenido no sabe si es sólido o líquido. Lo tienen crudo.

April 15, 2009

00 Internet estrena su primera sinfonía

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 1:58 pm

Recordad la Primera CiberOpera en: http://www.cyberopera.org/

Para ver TODOS los detalles

Internet estrena su primera sinfonía

AGENCIAS – Nueva York – 15/04/2009

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La orquesta formada por unos 90 músicos, entre ellos cuatro españoles, seleccionados por expertos y usuarios del portal de videos en Internet YouTube dará hoy un concierto en el Carnegie Hall de Nueva York después de tres días de ensayo. Provenientes de más de 30 países distintos, los miembros de esta orquesta han ensayado para el concierto desde sus hogares y han recibido a través de Internet lecciones elaboradas por músicos de prestigio internacional.

La noticia en otros webs

“Algunos de ellos están muy experimentados tanto (…) en música de cámara como en música de orquesta. Otros tienen bastante menos experiencia”, dijo el director de la orquesta, Michael Tilson Thomas, que también dirige la Sinfónica de San Francisco. Tilson precisó que, además de músicos profesionales, entre los miembros de la orquesta hay “físicos, jugadores de póquer y analistas financieros”, entre otras profesiones.

La orquesta tocará composiciones de Gabrieli, Bach, Mozart, Brahms, Villa Lobos y John Cage, así como la Sinfonía Nº 1 de Internet, Eroica, escrita por Tan Dun, quien fue galardonado con un Oscar a la Mejor Banda Sonora por Tigre y Dragón.

“Este es un moderno y antiguo matrimonio concertado de Google y YouTube”, afirmó Dun, para quien este proyecto es “un sueño hecho realidad”. El buscador Google es el actual propietario del portal YouTube. Para la creación de la orquesta, un jurado de expertos seleccionó primero a 200 personas de un total de 3.000 candidatos que habían enviado sus videos a YouTube en los meses diciembre y enero. Posteriormente fueron los usuarios de la página los que eligieron a los músicos de entre esos dos centenares de seleccionados.

El canal de la Orquesta Sinfónica de YouTube ha recibido más de 15 millones de visitas desde diciembre, según los responsables de la página, que tienen previsto publicar en la página una recopilación de los mejores momentos del concierto al día siguiente.

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