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December 1, 2009

00 Amy Goodman Detained at Canadian Border

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 2:10 pm
Tags: ,

TODAY’S DEMOCRACY NOW!:

*Amy Goodman Detained at Canadian Border, Questioned About Speech…and 2010 Olympics*

While traveling to Vancouver, Canada to speak at the Vancouver Public Library at a

benefit for community radio stations, Democracy Now! host Amy Goodman and her two colleagues

were detained by Canadian authorities. Amy was questioned extensively about the speech she

intended to give; their car was gone through by armed border guards, and their papers and

laptop computers were scoured. The armed interrogators were particularly interested in

whether she would be speaking about the upcoming Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics.


November 30, 2009

Goodman_web

Amy Goodman Detained at Canadian Border, Questioned About Speech…and 2010 Olympics

Listen/Watch/Read http://www.democracynow.org/2009/11/30/amy_goodman_detained

November 30, 2009

00 Google and the New Digital Future

Filed under: future — fores @ 10:28 pm
Tags: ,

Volume 56, Number 20 · December 17, 2009

Google and the New Digital Future

By Robert Darnton

November 9 is one of those strange dates haunted by history. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the collapse of the Soviet empire. The Nazis organized Kristallnacht on November 9, 1938, beginning their all-out campaign against Jews. On November 9, 1923, Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch was crushed in Munich, and on November 9, 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated and Germany was declared a republic. The date especially hovers over the history of Germany, but it marks great events in other countries as well: the Meiji Restoration in Japan, November 9, 1867; Bonaparte’s coup effectively ending the French Revolution, November 9, 1799; and the first sighting of land by the Pilgrims on the Mayflower, November 9, 1620.

On November 9, 2009, in the district court for the Southern District of New York, the Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers were scheduled to file a settlement to resolve their suit against Google for alleged breach of copyright in its program to digitize millions of books from research libraries and to make them available, for a fee, online. Not comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall, you might say. True, but for several months, all eyes in the world of books—authors, publishers, librarians, and a great many readers—were trained on the court and its judge, Denny Chin, because this seemingly small-scale squabble over copyright looked likely to determine the digital future for all of us.

Google has by now digitized some ten million books. On what terms will it make those texts available to readers? That is the question before Judge Chin. If he construes the case narrowly, according to precedents in class-action suits, he could conclude that none of the parties had been slighted. That decision would remove all obstacles to Google’s attempt to transform its digitizing of texts into the largest library and book-selling business the world has ever known. If Judge Chin were to take a broad view of the case, the settlement could be modified in ways that would protect the public against potential abuses of Google’s monopolistic power.


That Google’s enterprise (Google Book Search, or GBS) threatened to become an overweening monopoly became clear when the Department of Justice filed a memorandum with the court warning about the likelihood of a violation of antitrust legislation. More than four hundred other memorandums and amicus briefs also provided warnings about mounting opposition to GBS. In the face of this opposition, Google and the plaintiffs petitioned the court to delay a hearing that was scheduled for October 17 so that they could rework the settlement. Judge Chin set November 9 as the deadline when the new version of the settlement would be unveiled.

The great event turned out to be a dud, however. At the last minute, Google and the plaintiffs asked Judge Chin to grant another extension. He gave them four more days, so the witching hour finally took place not on November 9 but on a less auspicious date, Friday the 13th.

Why did the deadline look so monumental? The terms of the settlement will have a profound effect on the book industry for the foreseeable future. On the positive side, Google will make it possible for consumers to purchase access to millions of copyrighted books currently in print, and to read them on hand-held devices or computer screens, with payment going to authors and publishers as well as Google. Many millions more—books covered by copyright but out of print, at least seven million in all, including untold millions of “orphans” whose rightsholders have not been identified—will be available through subscriptions paid for by institutions such as universities. The database, along with books in the public domain that Google has already digitized, will constitute a gigantic digital library, and it will grow over time so that someday it could be larger than the Library of Congress (which now contains over 21 million catalogued books). By paying a moderate subscription fee, libraries, colleges, and educational institutions of all kinds could have instant access to a whole world of learning and literature.

But will the price be moderate? The negative arguments stress the danger that monopolies tend to charge monopoly prices. Equally important, they warn that Google’s dominance of access to books will reinforce its power over access to other kinds of information, raising concerns about privacy (Google may be able to aggregate data about your reading, e-mail, consumption, housing, travel, employment, and many other activities). The same dominance also raises questions about both competition (the class-action character of the suit could make it impossible for another entrepreneur to digitize orphan works, because only Google will be protected from litigation by rightsholders) and commitment to the public good. As a commercial enterprise, Google’s first duty is to provide a profit for its shareholders, and the settlement leaves no room for representation of libraries, readers, or the public in general.

An extensive argument about the pros and cons could turn Judge Chin’s courtroom into a forum where the full range of literary questions would be dramatized by debate. No courtroom drama took place on November 13, because nothing happened other than the filing of the revised settlement (call it GBS 2.0 to distinguish it from the original version of the settlement, GBS 1.0). But the filing was important in itself, because it marked the denouement of years of hard bargaining over who would control a large stretch of the digital landscape that is just now coming into view.

To be sure, GBS 2.0 will certainly be challenged by groups and individuals who claim they were not fairly represented in the classes of authors and publishers. The case may take years to work its way through the courts. Meanwhile, Google will go on digitizing; and as the legal situation evolves, it may devise further revisions of the settlement (GBS 3.0, GBS 4.0, etc.). The public will have to study all the new versions of the settlement in order to stay informed about the rules of the game while the game is being played. Who ultimately wins is not simply a matter of competition among potential entrepreneurs but an issue of enormous importance to everyone who cares about books, even though the public is reduced to the role of spectator.

As the first step toward a resolution, the filing on November 13 suggested just how far Google is willing to go in modifying the original settlement. Google’s spokesman hailed the revised version as providing all the benefits and none of the defects that one could expect. According to Dan Clancy, Google Books engineering director,

Google is still very excited about this agreement…. We look forward to continuing to work with rightsholders from around the world to fulfill our longstanding mission of increasing access to all the world’s books.

But the arguments in favor of the reworked settlement came from Google and the plaintiffs who will become its collaborators if their deal is approved. To get a sense of the counterarguments, one can survey the memorandums and amicus briefs that were filed with the court before November 9.[*] The protests that came from Europe are the most revealing. Although they concentrate on issues of special importance to foreigners—above all, the incompatibility of American class-action suits with protection for copyright holders who are not Americans—they show how the settlement was seen from a distant perspective.

The governments of France and Germany sent memorandums urging the court to reject the settlement “in its entirety” or at least insofar as it applied to their own citizens. Far from seeing any potential public good in it, they condemned it for creating an “unchecked, concentrated power” over the digitization of a vast amount of literature (this according to the French memorandum) and for doing so (according to the Germans) by a “commercially driven” agreement negotiated “in secrecy…behind closed doors by three interested parties, the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publishers and Google, Inc.”

In contrast to the commercial character of Google’s enterprise, both governments stressed the higher values represented by their national literatures. The French began their memorandum by invoking Pascal, Descartes, Molière, Racine, and other writers through Camus and Sartre, while the Germans summoned up the line that led from Goethe and Schiller to Heinrich Böll and Günter Grass. Each country cited the number of its Nobel Prize winners in literature (France sixteen, Germany twelve), and each buttressed its case by other evidence of high-mindedness. The Germans insisted on Gutenberg and his contribution to “the spread of science and culture.” The French cited the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen from 1789 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 in order to uphold the principle of “free access to information” threatened by Google’s “de facto monopoly.”

It is an odd spectacle: foreign governments defending a European notion of culture against the capitalistic inroads of an American company, and submitting their case to Judge Denny Chin of the Southern District Court of New York. What Judge Chin, who grew up in Hell’s Kitchen in a family of poor Chinese immigrants (and won a scholarship to Princeton University) made of it all is difficult to say. He did not tip his hand on November 13, nor did he say when a hearing would take place.

In playing the cultural card, the French emphasized the unique character of the book, “a product unlike other products”—its power to capture creativity, to enrich civilization, and to promote diversity, which, they claimed, would be compromised by Google’s commitment to commercialization. The Germans spoke in the name of “the land of poets and thinkers,” but they laid most stress on the right of privacy, which, they argued, Google could threaten by keeping data on who reads what. Both governments then listed a series of subsidiary arguments, which were nearly the same, word for word—unsurprisingly, as they engaged the same legal counsel:

1. The settlement gives Google a virtual monopoly over orphan works, even though it has no claim to their copyrights.

2. Its opt-out provision, which means that authors will be deemed to have accepted the settlement unless they notify Google to the contrary, violates the rights inherent in authorship.

3. It contains a most-favored- nation clause—i.e., a provision that prevents a potential competitor from obtaining better terms than Google in any new commercial uses of the digitized books. The terms of such future enterprises will be determined by a Books Rights Registry composed exclusively of representatives of the authors and publishers. The Registry will keep track of copyrights and cooperate with Google in setting prices.

4. It gives Google the power to censor its database by excluding up to 15 percent of the digitized works.

5. Its guidelines for pricing will promote Google’s commercial interests, not the good of the public, through the use of algorithms created by Google according to Google’s secret methods.

6. It favors secrecy in general, hiding audit procedures, preventing the public from attending meetings in which Google and the Registry will discuss library matters, and even requiring Google, the authors, and publishers to destroy all documents relevant to their agreement on the settlement.

Above all, the French and Germans condemned the settlement for sanctioning the “uncontrolled, autocratic concentration of power in a single corporate entity,” which threatened the “free exchange of ideas through literature.” To drive the point home, they both noted that Google has taken in more revenue than many countries—$22 billion in 2008.

The same points were made in a hearing before the European Commission on September 7 by the three most important international library associations: the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA), the European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associates (EBLIDA), and the Ligue des Bibliothèques Européennes de Recherche (LIBER). In nearly identical testimony, all three stressed the danger that “a large proportion of the world’s heritage of books in digital format will be under the control of a single corporate entity.”

It was Google’s sheer power that gave them pause. They summoned up the prospect of a digital library of 30 million books that would cost $750 million, and they concluded that Google would exercise something close to hegemony in the book world. Therefore, they appealed to the European Commission to defend the interests of the public by preventing Google from abusing its power.

Some of these associations submitted similar statements to the New York court. So did hundreds of other groups and individuals. After reading through them, one has the impression of a sense of alarm gathering force and rising to the surface of a collective consciousness. As November 9 approached, it did indeed promise to be a day of destiny, when we would begin to see into our digital future and to face the forces that might determine it.

Where was the Department of Justice in the pre-November debate? It, too, submitted a memorandum for the court’s consideration. After months of investigating potential violations of antitrust law, the DOJ pointed to two serious difficulties: the possibility of horizontal agreements among authors and publishers to restrict price competition and the further restriction of competition by Google’s de facto exclusive rights to the digital distribution of orphan works. Competitors would be denied access to millions of orphans, the memorandum argued, because they would not enjoy the immunity from suits for copyright infringement that the settlement reserves to Google. Moreover, the settlement’s equivalent of a most-favored-nation clause would prevent all competitors from obtaining better terms than Google’s even if they could put together an attractive database. Instead of expatiating in the European manner on the danger to the world’s literary heritage, the DOJ warned about something concrete: the “risk of market foreclosure.”

What to do? Far from sounding hostile to Google Book Search, the DOJ acknowledged its potential to promote the public good and announced, “The United States does not want the opportunity or momentum to be lost.” The memorandum could therefore be read as a prescription for a way to save the settlement. It concentrated on the most hotly debated provisions—those concerning the approximately seven million out-of-print but in-copyright books, especially orphans—and it suggested the following changes:

1. Require rightsholders of out-of-print books to participate in the settlement by opting in instead of operating from the assumption that they had agreed to participate unless they opted out. The shift to an opt-out default would remove Google’s control of books whose rightsholders cannot be identified or do not come forward.

2. Do not distribute the profits from the sale of orphan books to the parties of the settlement (Google and the authors and publishers) but rather use the money to fund a thorough search for the unknown rightsholders, and extend the search for a long period of time.

3. Appoint guardians to protect the interests of orphan rightsholders by serving on the registry.

4. Find some mechanism by which potential competitors to Google could gain access to orphan works without exposure to suits for infringement of copyright. Presumably this would require legislation by Congress.

5. Prevent Google from using out-of-print works in new commercial products without the owner’s permission.

The DOJ said it would continue to investigate the potential violation of antitrust laws, and it concluded with an unambiguous imperative: “This Court should reject the Proposed Settlement in its current form….” But its recommendations for an improved settlement did not go far—not nearly as far as those suggested by the governments of France and Germany and many other critics. The DOJ said nothing about the need for monitoring prices, protecting privacy, preventing censorship, providing representation of the public on the registry, and requiring full disclosure of Google’s secret data. If the DOJ encouraged Judge Chin to take a broad view of the settlement, it did not open the door wide.

The revised settlement, or GBS 2.0, released on November 13, reads as if Google and the plaintiffs took most of their cues from the DOJ’s memorandum. In a clear concession to the DOJ’s criticisms, GBS 2.0 provides that the Registry will include a court-appointed guardian to represent the rightsholders of unclaimed books. But it does not switch to an opt-out provision for such rightsholders—that is, according to GBS 2.0, any owner of a copyright of an out-of-print book would be deemed to accept the settlement unless he or she rejected it. Because millions of books, primarily orphans, fall into this category where the rightsholders are difficult to identify, Google alone would enjoy immunity from prosecution by any rightsholders who might turn up—and the exposure to litigation, which could easily reach $150,000 per title, would be enough to prevent any competitor from entering the field. Instead of providing a solution to the problem of orphan works, GBS 2.0 leaves Google in command of their commercialization, pending eventual legislation by Congress.

As to revenue from the sale of orphan books, GBS 2.0 complies with the DOJ’s insistence that the money not go to Google and the plaintiffs. Instead it will be spent in efforts to search for the unidentified rightsholders; and after being held for ten years, the funds will be distributed to charities determined by court order.

GBS 2.0 also follows the DOJ’s recommendation to abandon the most-favored-nation clause. Google’s competitors would be able to license out-of-print books in retail enterprises —that is, in selling individual works to consumers—although Google would maintain exclusive control of the institutional subscriptions to its gigantic database.

How the price of those subscriptions will be set remains unclear. GBS 2.0 has some language explaining the way its pricing algorithm will work, but it contains no effective mechanism to prevent price gouging, no provision for an antitrust consent decree that would empower a public authority to monitor prices, and no way to protect the public from excessive pricing should Google be taken over in the future by rapacious speculators.

GBS 2.0 does not therefore differ in essentials from GBS 1.0. It largely ignores the objections of foreign governments, except in one crucial respect: it partly meets the objections by narrowing the scope of GBS to books published in the United States and to countries with similar legal systems—that is, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Google will not display books published in countries like France and Germany, and it will give them representation on the Registry to protect their interests. Just what proportion of unclaimed works will now be excluded from the settlement by this concession remains to be clarified.

Will these concessions be enough to mollify Google’s critics outside the Department of Justice who are not parties to the settlement? Probably not, judging from a statement issued on November 13 by the Open Book Alliance, whose members include Microsoft, Amazon, and Yahoo:

By performing surgical nip and tuck, Google, the AAP [Association of American Publishers], and the AG [Authors Guild] are attempting to distract people from their continued efforts to establish a monopoly over digital content access and distribution; usurp Congress’s role in setting copyright policy; lock writers into their unsought registry, stripping them of their individual contract rights; put library budgets and patron privacy at risk; and establish a dangerous precedent by abusing the class action process.

What then is the outlook for the future? No one can predict the fate of the settlement as it bounces from court to court; but if the public good should be taken into consideration, one can imagine two general solutions to the problems posed by GBS, one maximal, one minimal.

The most ambitious solution would transform Google’s digital database into a truly public library. That, of course, would require an act of Congress, one that would make a decisive break with the American habit of determining public issues by private lawsuit. The legislation would have to settle ancillary problems—how to adjust copyright, deal with orphan books, and compensate Google for its investment in digitizing—but it would have the advantage of clearing up a messy legal landscape and of giving the American people what they deserve: a national digital library equal to the needs of the twenty-first century. But it is not clear how Google would react to such a buyout.

If state intervention is deemed to go too far against the American grain, a minimal solution could be devised for the private sector. Congress would have to intervene with legislation to protect the digitization of orphan works from lawsuits, but it would not need to appropriate funds. Instead, funding could come from a coalition of foundations. The digitizing, open-access distribution, and preservation of orphan works could be done by a nonprofit organization such as the Internet Archive, a nonprofit group that was built as a digital library of texts, images, and archived Web pages. In order to avoid conflict with interests in the current commercial market, the database would include only books in the public domain and orphan works. Its time span would increase as copyrights expired, and it could include an opt-in provision for rightsholders of books that are in copyright but out of print.

The work need not be done in haste. At the rate of a million books a year, we would have a great library, free and accessible to everyone, within a decade. And the job would be done right, with none of the missing pages, botched images, faulty editions, omitted artwork, censoring, and misconceived cataloging that mar Google’s enterprise. Bibliographers—who appear to play little or no part in Google’s enterprise—would direct operations along with computer engineers. Librarians would cooperate with both in order to assure the preservation of the books, another weak point in GBS, because Google is not committed to maintaining its corpus, and digitized texts easily degrade or become inaccessible.

This digitizing process could be subsidized as part of the Obama administration’s economic stimulus, and the overall cost, spread out over ten to twenty years, would be manageable, perhaps $750 million in all. Meanwhile, Google and anyone else would be free to exploit the commercial sector. The national digital library could be composed from the holdings of the Library of Congress alone or, failing that, from research libraries that have not opened all their collections to Google.

Perhaps other solutions could be devised. If the court did not resolve the Google Book Search problem on November 13, at least it had the potential to concentrate minds and stimulate public debate. We are agreed that something must be done to improve the nation’s health. Why not do something to enrich its culture?

—November 18, 2009

Notes

[*]The texts of the documents can be consulted at dockets.justia.com/docket/court-nysdce/case_no-1:2005cv08136/case_id-273913.

November 27, 2009

00 GL Saving 47.000 Women from Death by Cost-Benefit Analysis

Filed under: George Lakoff — fores @ 1:38 pm
Tags: , ,

George Lakoff

George Lakoff

Author and Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at UC Berkeley

Posted: November 24, 2009 03:43 PM

Give Thanks To Kathleen Sebelius

For Saving 47,000 Women From Death By Cost-Benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis can kill. The failure to distinguish statistics from arithmetic can kill. In the current debate over mammograms, the number of women projected to be at risk of death due to cost-benefit analysis is about 47,000.

That is the approximate number projected to die by the United States Preventative Task Force if their recommendations on scaling back mammograms had been accepted. It is their number, if you do the arithmetic, which they apparently did not.

Their statistics say that the life of “only” one woman in 1900 will be saved if mammograms start at age 40 instead of age 50. In other words, a 40-year-old woman’s “risk” of dying from breast cancer in the next ten years is only 1 in 1900. That seems like no risk at all. 1 divided by 1900 equals .000526. About half a woman per thousand. Miniscule, right?

Now, how many women in America would be affected?

The most recent (July, 2008) census figures say there are about 304,000,000 Americans, of which 50.7 percent are female. That’s about 154,000,000 females. Roughly 80,000,000 of them are under forty and about another 20,000,000 between 40 and 50. Of the 80,000,000 under 40, each one, under the proposed guidelines, would not get a mammogram until age 50. If “only” 1 in 1900 die as a result, that would be .000526 times 80,000,000, which equals about 42,000.

In short, moving the mammogram age from 40 to 50 would result in the deaths of 42,000 women now 40 or under, according to the statistics of the United States Preventative Task Force. Of the 20,000,000 between 40 and 50, it could mean the deaths of as many as 10,500 women, though the figure may be somewhat lower because half are more than halfway through the critical period. There might be as few as half, say, 5,000 deaths. Adding 42,000 and 5,000, we get a ballpark figure of 47,000 of currently alive American females who would die needlessly under the proposed task force restriction on mammograms. Of course, as more are born, the absolute numbers would go up.

What is at issue is called “framing.” The Preventive Task Force chose the probability of risk frame: only 1 in 1900. But the arithmetic frame reveals the more important truth.

Framing, in this case as in so many others, is a matter of life and death. Take the framing in the NY Times (November 18, 2009) in the front-page news analysis by Kevin Sack and in the op-ed by Robert Aronowitz. Sack frames the mammogram debate as the “science of medicine” versus “medical consumerism.” Aronowitz calls it “wishful thinking” that early mammograms could help and speaks of “the very small numbers of lives potentially saved.”

You can see why cost-benefit analysis can kill. Its use isn’t science. Real scientists do arithmetic as well as statistics. Medical science is about real people, not percentages or statistics, especially when large numbers of real people are involved and small differences in risk can produce large numbers of deaths.

The Preventive Task Force also uses the “harm” frame. The task force observes that more mammograms mean more false positives and claims that false positives do “harm.” But no science is presented showing that the “harm” done is greater than the deaths of 47,000 women.

What is the “harm?” Anxiety and unnecessary biopsies from false positives are listed as the “harms.” My wife had such a false positive. The anxiety came for economic reasons: she had to wait for a biopsy because no one who could perform one was present when the mammogram was done, due to economic restrictions. The biopsy when it came was simple: a needle inserted to withdraw fluid, like taking a blood sample. No harm. If the biopsy had been done immediately, there would have been no need for anxiety. But the task force does not recommend immediate biopsies as a way to eliminate such “harm.”

Aronowitz also claims that the figures show that mammograms haven’t helped prevent breast cancer. He observes that the rate of 28 breast cancer deaths per 100,000 people has not changed substantially since the 50’s, despite more mammography and better treatments. But that could mean, and probably does mean, that there has been an increase in breast cancer offset by earlier detection and better treatment, saving tens of thousands of lives, but not affecting the overall rate. But he did not consider the possibility that the occurrence of breast cancer might have increased, while the rate of deaths did not change because of earlier detection due to mammograms.

I suspect that the real “harm” intended is economic harm – the costs of the “unnecessary” mammograms and biopsies. But the task force gives no figures weighing the economic costs versus the human “cost” of the deaths of 47,000 women. Now, in cost-benefit analysis, a commonly cited figure for the value of an American life is $6.5 million. 47,000 times 6.5 million is $305, 500,000,000. That is, 305 billion five hundred million dollars. Of course, that would be spread over the next forty years, but it’s not clear that such a cost-benefit analysis would make this less than the cost of mammograms and biopsies, all moral issues and human costs aside. Unfortunately, the Preventive Task Force doesn’t do the calculation, so my figures may be off. The exact figures are not the point. The point is to go beyond rates to numbers.

In the present debate over health care, economics has become the main issue, but the Preventive Task Force hides it by framing. “Cost-benefit analysis” has been reframed as “risk-benefit analysis,” as if the Preventive Task Force were not concerned with “cost” to insurance companies and tax-payers, but rather with “risk” to women. But “risk-benefit analysis” is just cost-benefit analysis, which in turn is what corporations use to maximize profit in the short term. Both cost-benefit analysis and the Preventive Task Force were introduced as government institutions by the Reagan administration. They were right-wing moves – part of the strategy to privatize government.

As the Obama administration shifted the health care debate from morality to economics, cost-benefit analysis entered in the form of “evidence-based medicine,” where the “evidence” comes from statistics. This is seen as a major way to reduce the cost of health care. This is where “risk-benefit analysis” is cost-benefit analysis publicly and proudly discussed.

Is such an application of cost-benefit analysis always immoral? Hardly. It can be very useful. But it has to be looked at carefully, as the mammogram example shows. In the mammogram example, low probability events can have major effects!

When is a case of “evidence-based medicine” that uses cost-benefit analysis an instance of low probability events that can have major effects, effects serious enough to far outweigh the cost-benefit analysis? This is a serious and difficult question.

It is also a question of concern in the Obama White House. There are three high-powered experts there committed to such questions. One is Ezekial Emanuel, Rahm Emanuel’s brother, who is perhaps the best-known advocate of evidence-based medicine. He is an advisor to Peter Orszag, Budget Director, who sees medicine as an economic problem. The third is Cass Sunstein, Obama’s Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, also known as the cost-benefit czar. Sunstein is known for specializing in low probability events that have major effects. Political observers should watch how such issues are handled by the administration as they arise.

The official administration reaction is so far against the Preventive Task Force recommendation. Health and Human Services Secretary Sebelius has rejected it and said to make no change.

Hooray for Kathleen Sebelius! Tens of thousands of women owe her their lives.

The political fallout has been instructive. Business columnist for the Washington Post Steve Pearlstein (November 20, 2009) attacked Sebelius as not wanting to save money, but rather promoting waste. This is pretty much what the NY Times position (both front-page analysis and op-ed) seems to be. Most voices on the right have ignored Sebelius’ official response and instead attributed the Reagan-era Preventive Task Force’s recommendations to official Obama Health care policy, calling it “rationing” health care, while ignoring the fact that most rationing of health care is actually done by insurance companies. As expected, the most radical conservatives have seen this not only as an Obama move, but have likened it to mythical “death panels.”

I stand with Sebelius, and I take it to be the official Obama administration view. When arithmetic is added to statistics, this is a clear case of a low probability event with major life-and-death consequences for tens of thousands of people. The overly simplistic framings — either accepting or rejecting the cost-benefit analysis without looking further — are dangerous. Just accepting the task force’s recommendation is dangerous to the women of this country, now and in the future. Calling it “rationing” and using it to argue against the health care bills in Congress is dangerous to us all.

As we sit down to Thanksgiving dinner, let us thank Kathleen Sebelius.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-lakoff/give-thanks-to-kathleen-s_b_369484.html

November 13, 2009

00 Spot publicitario ‘Incredible VLC’

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 2:37 pm
Tags: ,

Hay que verlo para creerlo. Averiguaré quién lo ha realizado pues es muy bueno. Aunque lo pague el Tourist Board de VLC no dicen por ningún lado quién ha realizado la campaña. Se arrepentirán de malgastar el concepto 2.0, si no al tiempo

http://www.vlcincrediblebuttrue.com

Si puedes échale un vistazo y te sorprenderás.


November 12, 2009

00 End of Japanese whaling may be in sight

Filed under: módulo básico — fores @ 9:20 pm
Tags:
Humpback whale off the coast of Tonga

“I can see an end to whaling from here!”

Enlarge Image

Tokyo, Japan — We’ve been watching the horizon for this one for a very long time, but our colleagues up in the crow’s nest report that a new blip on the horizon could mean an end to Japanese whaling in Antarctica.

A major review of Japanese government spending could spell the end to whaling in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary.

The review committee, commissioned to cut wasteful programmes by Japan’s new government, has proposed massive cuts in subsidies to a body which funds the so-called whaling research programme.

Without government subsidies, the whaling programme would be doomed.

The Spending Review Committee recommended that the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Fund (OFCF), which gives loans to the Institute for Cetacean Research (ICR) to run the discredited science programme, have all of its funding revoked, except monies needed for loans in 2010.

The OFCF claims it needs 70.4 billion yen (around US$780 million) for various programmes, including whaling, in 2010. The Review Committee and Cabinet Office will determine by early next year if the proposed operations for 2010 are actually “necessary” or should also be cut.

Waste of money? Well, yes…

Fact is, if the Review Committee wanted to know if whaling was a waste of taxpayers’ money or not, they could have asked us. Our colleagues at Greenpeace Japan have been relentlessly attacking the whaling programme domestically as a waste of taxpayers’ money.

In particular, two activists, Junichi Sato and Toru Suzuki, sparked a domestic debate in Japan when they revealed widespread corruption in the government-supported programme. They set off a backlash from powerful interests, and found themselves arrested for “stealing” whale meat which they had presented to police as evidence of embezzlement.

Junichi and Toru were arrested with the TV cameras rolling, and our Greenpeace offices were raided by police who seized supporter lists, documents, and computer disks in an attempt to intimidate our staff and supporters and deter our efforts.  Junichi and Toru still await trial and face up to ten years in prison for the crime of “stealing” whale meat that they had turned over to police as evidence of the embezzlement scandal.

But they have not been quiet. Both activists have spoken out against the cost of the whaling programme and the fact that only a handful of fat-cat bureaucrats really profit from the programme. Last year alone it cost 8 billion yen, or nearly US$90  million, to run the annual Southern Ocean whale hunt. Of that, 1.2 billion yen, or more than US$10 million, came from government subsidies. The rest is in theory covered by the sales of whale meat.

Whaling is bad business

The Institute for Cetacean Research, which runs the whaling programme, has failed to repay government loans for several years now, as demand for whale meat has plummeted and the cost of whaling increased. Practises which would have lead to bankruptcy for any commercial firm have been the target of outspoken criticism not only from Greenpeace Japan, but from the business press and even the former spokesperson for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Tomohiko Taniguchi. Taniguchi lamented the financial propping up of a programme that caused endless headaches for Tokyo abroad and generated revenues worth “less than one-tenth the value of the country’s annual market for toothbrushes.”

With the change in government at the recent election, a new focus on reducing government spending and cutting wasteful programmes has meant a more sympathetic ear for whaling critics like Junichi and Toru. The Prime Minster recently shocked conservative politicians who equate whaling and patriotism by admitting that he disliked whale meat — something that would have been an unthinkable admission for his predecessor.

Fighting for three decades

Greenpeace has been fighting Japanese whaling for more than three decades, from the waters of the Southern Ocean to the courts of Japan.

We first brought whaling to the world’s attention in 1975 when activists put their own lives on the line by navigating small inflatable boats in front of the harpoons.   We have opposed whaling operations in countries including Australia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Iceland, Spain, Norway and Russia and exposed and shut down pirate whaling operations.  Over the years, our tactics have widened to include consumer pressure — which was crucial in getting western corporations such as Gortons Seafood to distance themselves from whaling and financially isolate the whalers — and domestic efforts in Japan aimed at communicating the cost of whaling to the 71 percent of the Japanese public that do not support it.  In 2008, we suspended our voyages to the Southern Oceans in favour of concentrating efforts on domestic pressure in Japan, including “Operation Silver Bullet” our ongoing investigation into whale meat embezzlement and scandals in the whaling industry.

Today, it seems that strategy is paying off.  All of us who have worked together on this issue for decades are holding our breath — that an end to Japanese whaling could well be on the way.

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